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THE METAPHYSICS OF PROPERTY: LOOKING BENEATH THE 
SURFACE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW AFTER TAHOE-
SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING 
AGENCY† 
“Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. . . . 
Where there is an excess of liberty, the effect is the same, tho’ from an 
opposite cause.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An opportunity to clarify the boundaries of regulatory takings law arose 
when the Supreme Court of the United States considered the alleged takings of 
property by the regional regulatory authority in the Lake Tahoe Basin in 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.2  For many years since its origin, the 
doctrine of regulatory takings has remained somewhat undefined.  By the end 
of 2001, takings law had evolved into a nuanced and often convoluted judicial 
analysis as courts were challenged with determining the constitutionality of 
legislative approaches to limiting land use that have become more intrusive 
than ever before into the realm of private property ownership.  Though such 
regulatory approaches are common responses to rapid growth and development 
that might have adverse impacts on a community, they deprive property 
owners of liberty and property rights in a way that the Constitution seems to 
expressly prohibit. 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides 
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”3  The seemingly straightforward nature of the Takings Clause 
has given rise to jurisprudence over the past century that continues to generate 
intense discussion and debate. 
For more than 200 years, property has existed as a boundary protecting 
individual rights from encroachment by local government and other citizens.  
 
† This Comment was selected as the Best Student Work to be published in the Saint Louis 
University Law Journal for 2002-2003. 
 1. James Madison, Property, THE NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in CLASSICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 185 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000). 
 2. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Embodied within the structure of the Constitution itself, private property 
maintains the essential character of the social compact—it defines the extent of 
the state’s police powers and establishes the frontier of the political landscape 
as a buffer between the majoritarian powers of democratic government and the 
American notions of liberty and personal independence.4  But depending on 
who is asked, there are often competing characterizations of what “property” 
actually means.  To many, private property is the bastion of liberty and the 
foundation of the values we hold sacred.  To others, however, the nature of 
property is not so much concerned with individual significance as it is with the 
underlying relation that binds us together in society.5 
The absence of a cogent scientific test for when a taking of property has 
occurred has led to inconsistent judicial decisions that do not provide an 
accurate guide for the decisions of both citizens and state government, property 
developers and land use planners, and property owners and advocates of 
sustainable development.6  As a result, the Supreme Court accepted the 
opportunity to define just exactly what property the Constitution protects from 
being taken.7  The Court would attempt the daunting task of defining the extent 
of property rights by trying, yet again, to differentiate between mere regulation 
and Constitutional taking.8 
At the outset of the development of modern takings jurisprudence, there 
was some debate as to whether or not the Constitution was intended to require 
compensation for regulatory takings—where no physical property is actually 
 
 4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 15 (1985) (observing that the Lockean ideas of property from which our 
founders were largely influenced require “an explicit and rigorous theory of forced exchanges 
between the sovereign and the individual that can account both for the monopoly of force and for 
the preservation of liberty and property”) (emphasis added). 
 5. Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role 
for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1140 (1996) (noting 
that property was not viewed solely as an individualized end in the framework of Madisonian 
republicanism but as a means to achieve the public good).  The author notes: “Thus the 
Revolutionaries did not intend to provide men with property so that they might flee from public 
responsibility into selfish privatism; property was rather the necessary basis for a committed 
republican citizenry.”  Id. (quoting DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 68 (1980)). 
 6. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 
771 (2000), aff’d 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (noting that “[c]ourts have had little success in devising 
any set formula for determining when government regulation of private property amounts to a 
regulatory taking”). 
 7. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948 (2001). 
 8. “The attempt to distinguish ‘regulation’ from ‘taking’ is the most haunting 
jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law . . . one that may be the 
lawyer’s equivalent of the physicist’s hunt for the quark.”  Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan 
Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2170 
(2002). 
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confiscated, but where some economically viable use is taken from a parcel of 
real property or where less than the whole value of the property in question is 
taken.9  It is now well-established, however, that the government can “take” 
private property not only by the physical appropriation of a part or parcel of 
land but also by imposing substantial regulations upon private property.10 
Justice Holmes pronounced, in Pennsylvania Coal Co.  v. Mahon in 1922, 
that “[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”11  
The murky question of when such government regulation of private property 
becomes too much, however, still haunts modern takings law.  Since the vague 
regulatory takings principle was expressed, this Fifth Amendment protection of 
private property has given rise to an unclear body of law.12  While the Takings 
Clause is designed to bar government from forcing some individuals to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it “has been unable to 
develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require 
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated for by the 
 
 9. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (contending that the evidence of 
original intent and early case law interpretations clearly indicate that the Takings Clause was 
intended to apply only to physical takings and not government regulations imposing limitations 
on property, and also that the limited scope of the takings clause reflects the fact that the founders 
believed that physical possession of property was particularly vulnerable to process failure).  See 
also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055-60 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making It Up—”Original Intent” and Federal Takings 
Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203 (2003); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and 
the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000); William Michael 
Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 710, 711 (1985); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 
YALE L.J. 36, 56-59 (1964-1965).  But see Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original 
Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999) 
(arguing contrary to most recent scholarship that the text and historical record of the Takings 
Clause support a just compensation requirement for so-called “regulatory takings”). 
 10. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 37-39; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. 
 11. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added). 
 12. Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence:” The 
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE 
L.J. 613, 679-80 (1996); Haar & Wolf, supra note 8, at 2169-70 (noting the “cacophony of 
opinions” in recent takings cases as “compris[ing] a cry for help by a badly divided Court”); 
James M. Reynolds, Takings Jurisprudence and Complex Schemes of Land Use Regulation: What 
the Supreme Court Could Learn from the States, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 457, 457 (2002) (observing 
that federal regulatory takings jurisprudence has “evolved into a highly nuanced science that 
defies easy categorization into bright-line rules or even readily ascertainable standards”) 
(emphasis added).  See also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and the Rule of Law: 
Teaching Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713 (2002) (describing the 
difficulty of teaching this complex subject to first-year law students). 
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government, rather than allow such injuries to remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons.”13 
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency,14 the Supreme Court was faced with the threshold question of whether 
or not a taking of private property had occurred because of government 
regulations that limited the use of such property.  This Comment will briefly 
explore the nuances of the regulatory takings analysis that are rooted in the 
enduring conflict between private property rights and the ability of government 
to use the police power to regulate the use of real property to some degree in 
order to protect the general welfare, which includes the protection of public 
lands.15  This Comment will attempt to show that the answer to an analysis of 
what kinds of government actions would actually constitute a taking 
necessarily hinges not only on how one characterizes the property interest 
allegedly taken by government regulation, but also on how we define the 
property that is actually protected by the Constitution and consequently the 
extent to which that property can be taken.16 
In the context of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra, this 
Comment illustrates the views of competing factions that fight over where the 
boundary between regulation and the free use of property exists.  Ideas about 
the role property plays in our political economy serve as the foundation from 
which this Comment, and the Supreme Court, examines the question of when 
regulation crosses that line from accepted exercise of the police power to 
 
 13. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations omitted).  
See also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967). 
 14. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 15. Lake Tahoe is owned by the States of California and Nevada, which hold it in trust for 
all residents, and it is also considered a navigable water of the United States.  See NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 321.595 (2001) (enacted in 1979); State of California v. Superior Court of Placer County, 
625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981). 
 16. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (observing that “[h]istorically, 
property definitions have continuously adjusted to reflect new economic and social structures”).  
“In determining whether government action affecting property is an unconstitutional deprivation 
of ownership rights under the Just Compensation Clause, a court must interpret the word ‘taken.’”  
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 n.17 (2002) 
[hereinafter Tahoe-Sierra] (noting also that in the regulatory takings question, “the predicate of a 
taking is not self-evident, . . . the analysis is more complex”). 
  Professor Richard Epstein has reduced the analysis of the eminent domain clause to four 
essential questions that must be addressed, in sequence: Is there a taking of private property?  Is 
there any justification for taking that private property?  Is the taking for public use?  Is there any 
compensation for the property so taken?  See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 31.  This Comment, like 
the case upon which it remarks, focuses on that threshold inquiry that must first be answered and 
the next question that logically follows from it: Is there a “taking” of some private “property?”  
And if so, is there any legitimate justification for the taking? 
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become an unconstitutional taking requiring compensation to aggrieved 
property owners.  The regulatory takings analysis will hopefully become more 
clear and outcomes more predictable by internalizing the underlying 
assumptions and conceptualizations of property that structure the inquiry at its 
most fundamental level.  In the end, this Comment does not attempt to 
formulate some new definition of property; rather, it suggests that the recent 
case law and academic literature reflecting the complexity of the property 
rights/land use planning conflict indicate that there might be no consistent 
characterization of property that can be applied in every situation.  It is this 
recognition that will ultimately provide an opportunity for landowners and 
town planners—and invite judges and lawmakers—to more precisely define 
the metes and bounds of the private property that is protected by the 
Constitution. 
This Comment will survey some of the approaches to conceptualizing the 
Constitutional definition of property that is protected from government 
interference, explore the role these models might play in influencing the 
direction of the ostensibly indefinite takings analysis, and endeavor to sketch 
an outline for a contemporary understanding of property that reflects 
traditional notions of fairness and justice and appreciates the political function 
that private property plays in maintaining the American republic.  Part II of 
this Comment will investigate the utility that the idea of property has 
performed in American society, discuss the increasing power of government to 
regulate the use of private property, and provide a brief background of the law 
of takings before Tahoe-Sierra.  Part III will discuss the factual circumstances 
leading to the Tahoe-Sierra litigation, the dueling approaches to the takings 
analysis advanced by the Court’s three opinions, and the immediate legal 
consequences of the Supreme Court majority’s 6–3 decision.  Part IV provides 
an in-depth analysis of what the case represents in the evolution of takings 
jurisprudence, and it also considers the likely application of the holding for 
future property rights disputes.  Finally, this Comment offers a brief conclusion 
concerning the inevitable political consequences of the Tahoe-Sierra decision 
and the possible effects it may have on the development of the doctrine of 
regulatory takings. 
II.  LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF PROPERTY 
  “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it 
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” 
  “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.”17 
 
 17. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 
117 (1902), quoted in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1356 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 
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Property plays an essential role in American society, however, nowhere in 
the Constitution is the term “property” actually defined.18  The concept of 
private property is inexorably built into our ideal of individual freedom, and it 
holds a venerated position in the American dream.19  The opportunity to 
acquire real property is an unassailable American right that is recognized by 
scholars as one of the philosophical foundations of our political system.20  For 
government is instituted, according to James Madison, no less for the 
protection of property than for the protection of persons or individuals.21 
Property rights hold a unique place in the American system, and the 
political philosophy of John Locke and other Enlightenment-era thinkers 
cultivated the belief that property was a “natural political right of individuals 
that preserved political liberty and fostered limited government.”22  These 
ideas about property, based in emerging free market concepts of the relation of 
liberty and property, have been widely credited as influencing the beliefs of the 
 
2002) (referencing Alice’s adventures to show the “creative use of language” in defining the 
words “permanent” and “temporary” that had previously been applied in Federal Circuit 
precedent extending the categorical taking analysis to “conclude that a permanent physical 
occupation, and therefore a taking, had occurred, without really requiring that the taking be 
permanent” in a temporal sense, but only permanent as an actual and direct physical occupation) 
(citations omitted). 
 18. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1189-90 
(1999) (noting that “in defining ‘private property,’ the Supreme Court . . . does not receive 
guidance from the text of the Constitution, a document that once mentions and nowhere defines 
the term”).  “The text of the Takings Clause is ambiguous because the original understanding of 
the word ‘property’ is uncertain.”  Gold, supra note 9, at 240.  See also Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 996, 998 (2000) (labeling the four 
“incomplete and disconcertingly disconnected” visions of how courts should define property but 
believing that “an integrated understanding is still possible”). 
 19. See, e.g., VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. I (June 12, 1776) (listing as “inherent 
rights . . . the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing 
property”), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/virginia.htm (last modified Dec. 18, 2003).  See 
also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 91 (1994) (noting Gouverneur Morris’s concept of property in the market 
economy as “the right to free use”). 
 20. See Frank Michelman, Takings: 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1626 (1988) (observing 
that “property [to the founders of American constitutionalism] was their inspiration for the idea of 
a private sphere of individual self-determination securely bounded off from politics by law”).  
Epstein’s version of takings doctrine is also embedded in a normative theory of constitutionalism 
that undertakes to treat both democracy and limited government as first principles.  Id.  See also 
Seán Patrick Donlan, Virtue and Vigour: The Federalist and American Civic Republicanism, 21 
DUBLIN U. L.J. 90, 99 (1999) (noting that to early Americans, “[p]roperty was valorised not for 
its own sake . . . but for the sake of self-governance”). 
 21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 278 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 1982). 
 22. DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 169 (1992). 
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founders who organized the innovative social contract that created our nation.23  
Such influences can readily be seen in the proclamation of the self-evident 
truths expressed in the Declaration of Independence—that all men are born 
with certain unalienable rights such as “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness”24—and are also embodied within the structure of the Constitution 
itself.25 
Over the past few decades, individual property rights have been more 
limited by government action.26  Largely in response to the growth of the large 
regulatory state emerging in the 1970s, a political movement formed that 
advocated for stronger protection of private property rights from government 
interference by turning toward all three branches of government.27  On the 
 
 23. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 278 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (articulating the relation of government 
and private property in a civil society that comes out of the “state of nature”).  Locke observed: 
For the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men 
enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have 
property, without which they must be suppos’d to lose that by entering into Society, 
which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to 
own. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  For a discussion of the transformation of property and its meaning in 
early America, see SCHULTZ, supra note 22, at 21-32 (attempting to describe how the meaning of 
property moved from the “level of political rhetoric, permeated political consciousness, and was 
translated into social reality” and specific social policies).  See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE & 
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 70-72 (1991) (pointing to the influence of 
the political philosophy of John Locke in giving content to the Takings Clause as understood by 
the Eighteenth Century American statesmen). 
 24. Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men . . . are endowed . . . with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”), with LOCKE, supra note 23, at 406.  
Locke understood the protection of “Life, Liberty and Estate” as the state’s essential function.  
Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The Reconciliation of Private Property and Representative 
Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 593 (1995) (citing LOCKE, supra note 23, at 367). 
 25. See U.S. CONST. amend V; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 
(1992).  “[T]he notion . . . that title [to land] is somehow held subject to the ‘implied limitation’ 
that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the 
historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our Constitutional 
culture.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. 
 26. Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 
481 (1983).  Sax noted: 
I believe that we have moved in recent years from a situation . . . in which we generally 
encourage developmental rights, though recognizing they must from time to time be 
restrained . . . . As a result, we are in the midst of a major transformation in which 
property rights are being fundamentally redefined to the disadvantage of property owners. 
Id. at 481. 
 27. Among the numerous inverse condemnation lawsuits filed over the past quarter century, 
people have often pressured the Executive Branch to act and strengthen property rights against 
government action.  See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554-59 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. 
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other hand, the emergence of comprehensive land use planning as a means for 
citizen groups and municipal, state, and regional levels of government to 
control the harmful environmental effects of intense, sprawling urban and 
suburban development has, to some extent, offset the movement for the 
increased protection of property rights.28  Such planning has become an 
integral tool in the process of progress, as it allows Americans to design 
calculated growth strategies that attempt to avoid the strain placed upon land 
and economic resources that too often accompany development and that has 
contributed to the decline of overall environmental quality of the country. 
It is generally accepted that “the widespread and secure ownership of 
property is the sine qua non of prosperity.”29  However, the founders 
 
§ 601 (1996) (President Ronald Reagan’s 1988 Executive Order for Property Rights Legislation 
entitled “Government Actions and Interference With Constitutionally Protected Property Rights”) 
(attempting to go beyond the Supreme Court’s takings rules pronounced in the famous 1987 
takings cases by relaxing the threshold standard for finding a taking and stating that such a taking 
occurs if a regulation only “substantially affects” the value of property); see also James M. 
McElfish, Jr., The Takings Executive Order: Constitutional Jurisprudence or Political 
Philosophy?, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10474 (1988) (calling the order a “fundamental[] restatement of 
the Administration’s core political philosophy of minimizing the intrusiveness of federal 
regulation upon private interests”).  Ironically, it was Ronald Reagan himself who, as Governor 
of California, signed California’s bill endorsing the creation of the Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency and, after early silence on the issue, praised the compact that created the agency that was 
the defendant in Tahoe-Sierra.  See Dan Herber, Comment, Surviving the View Through the 
Lochner Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and the Case for Upholding Developmental Moratoria, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 913, 914 n.10 (2002). 
  Also, people have increasingly turned to the legislative branches of state governments 
for relief.  For an analysis of a recent innovative legislative approach to the “perceived inability of 
constitutional law to adequately protect property rights from environmental regulations that were 
themselves a reaction to rapid changes in population, technology, and knowledge,” see George E. 
Grimes, Jr., Texas Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act: A Political Solution to the 
Regulatory Takings Problem, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 557 (1996) (summarizing the Texas Real 
Property Rights Preservation Act of 1995 requiring compensation when a regulation reduces the 
value of property by more than twenty-five percent).  By requiring takings-impact assessments 
and providing a statutory bright-line definition of regulatory takings at a twenty-five percent 
reduction in the value of real property, the Act favors property owners and should increase 
government regulators’ awareness of such property rights relative to other public interests.  Id. at 
612.  See also Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings 
Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187 (1997). 
  In addition, the Supreme Court has “reconceptualized the Takings Clause, deploying it 
as a powerful new tool to neutralize a wide range of environmental and land-use regulation and to 
uphold personal liberty—the right to own and use private property—that some Justices feel has 
been severely devalued.”  Haar & Wolf, supra note 8, at 2169. 
 28. See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, 
PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 107-66 (1999). 
 29. Jeffrey W. Porter, Will Property Rights Legislation Endanger Smart Growth Efforts?, 30 
REAL ESTATE L.J. 275, 285 (2002) (quoting TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY 
AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES, 172, 341 (1998)). 
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recognized that the regulation of property could not be outside the sphere of 
governmental power because it is in the nature of property rights that they 
require government to recognize and defend them, for “property rights are . . . 
defined, determined, and regulated by society.”30  “[L]aw is born of property, 
not the reverse.”31  And as the law has attempted to balance the conflicting 
ideas about the role of property in the development of the regulatory taking 
analysis, the courts have produced a “dense thicket” of jurisprudence resulting 
in confusion and frustration for land-use planning and property owners alike.32 
A. Property: “Not merely transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so”33 
While it may seem intuitive, “property” is a term of art that is difficult to 
grasp and can be even more difficult to articulate.34  The conception of 
property held by the specialist (the attorney or the economist, for example) is 
quite different from that held by the ordinary citizen.35  Though there are many 
theories of how property interests should be characterized, there is no clear 
consensus on their definition.  The elusive nature of how exactly to define the 
property interest(s) at stake in the regulatory takings analysis is the 
 
 30. NEDELSKY, supra note 19, at 91 (noting also that when identified with freedom, the case 
for the “inviolability of property” was a powerful one).  Nedelsky contends that “[w]hatever their 
intrinsic values, life and liberty were not the reasons men joined together in societies and formed 
governments.  It was only for the sake of property that men gave up the greater freedom of the 
state of nature and submitted themselves to the constraints of society and government.”  Id. at 68.  
See also Thomas W. Merrill, Zero-Sum Madison, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1392 (1992) (reviewing 
NEDELSKY, supra note 19.). 
 31. BETHELL, supra note 29.  “Property and law are born and must die together.  Before the 
laws there was no property; take away the laws, all property ceases.”  RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY 
AND FREEDOM 104 (1999) (quoting philosopher Jeremy Bentham). 
 32. See W.R. Grace & Co. Conn. v. Cambridge City Council, 779 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2002) (noting the court’s entrance into “the dense thicket of court decisions that have 
sought to establish the boundary between private property rights and permissible governmental 
action limiting the value of those rights”). 
 33. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 175 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1872) (describing the 
exceptional clarity of Lake Tahoe’s water), quoted in Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 307 (2002). 
 34. See, e.g., L.T. Hobhouse, The Historical Evolution of Property, in Fact and in Idea 3 
(1913), reprinted in CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 369 (Richard A. 
Epstein ed., 2000).  The author noted: “The divergence between legal theory and economic fact, 
between written law and popular custom, between implied rights and actual enjoyment, enables 
one and the same institution to be painted . . . in very different colours.”  Id.  See also Hanoch 
Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1519-20 (2003). 
 35. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 69 (J. 
Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (proclaiming the “death of property” as 
commonly understood).  Grey noted that “specialists and theoreticians have no answer; or rather, 
they have a multiplicity of widely differing answers, related only in that they bear some 
association or analogy, more or less remote, to the common notion of property as ownership of 
things.”  Id. at 71.  For a thorough analysis of the many different views of property, see BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). 
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fundamental problem with such an undertaking.36  An initial survey of the 
views of the competing factions that fight about where that boundary line 
between regulation and free use of property should be drawn will be helpful to 
understanding the regulatory takings analysis. 
The English jurist William Blackstone defined the traditional view of 
property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world.”37  Thus, property in its liberal 
and traditional sense is the right to ownership of an external thing or material 
object.38  Even checking the thesaurus on a word processor, the word property 
produces only two synonyms: possession and land.  But while the vestiges of 
an archaic concept of property pervade modern thought, property is more than 
just a thing that is owned; rather, it is the rights or relationships to particular 
interests in that thing that can be alienated from the proprietor without losing 
the right to other interests in the same tangible property.39  In a modern 
economy, “[p]roperty [has become] identified less and less with the rural 
domain and more and more with capital goods and consumers’ durables.”40  In 
fact, the Twentieth Century saw the emergence of the metaphor of property as 
a “bundle of sticks.”41  Each stick symbolizes a specific interest that might be 
associated with a piece of real property, including in no particular order the 
right to use, the right to enjoy, the right to exclude others, and the right to 
 
 36. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting the “elastic nature of property rights”). 
 37. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1803), cited in 
ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE CONTROL 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 25 (1999). 
 38. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999).  In fact, Black’s defines “property 
right” as “[a] right to specific property, whether tangible or intangible.”  Id. at 1323 (emphasis 
added). 
 39. See ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 26.  “I think it fair to say,” Ackerman surmised, “that 
one of the main points of the first-year Property course is to disabuse entering law students of 
their primitive lay notions regarding ownership.”  Id.  See also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) 
(recognizing the social or political function of property). 
 40. Jean Baechler, Liberty, Property, and Equality, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY, supra note 
35, at 276.  Observing that “the connection between the new forms of property and freedom is 
less evident” than in the view from which the founders conceived of the importance of property, 
the author notes that “the relation between private property and liberty, so clear to the thinkers of 
the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, should become obscure, and even inverted, . . . in the 
mind of the public today.”  Id. at 276, 277. 
 41. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 35, at 81 n.40 (“The ‘bundle-of-rights’ conception of property 
appears in well-articulated form for the first time . . . in Wesley Hohfeld”).  Interestingly, Grey 
also observed that the legal realists who developed the bundle notion were, on the whole, 
supporters of the regulatory and welfare state, and in the writing developing such a conception, a 
“purpose to remove the sanctity that had traditionally attached to the rights of property can often 
be discerned.”  Id. at 81. 
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dispose of or transfer title.  The idea of the bundle necessarily implies that 
these rights are held together—that there is a bundle and yet many sticks at the 
same time. 
Regulatory takings jurisprudence has challenged the Supreme Court with 
the difficulty of determining whether the removal of one stick in the bundle is 
a compensable taking and also the burden of deciding to what degree the 
government can regulate those distinct property rights without offending the 
Constitution.42  It is not easy for the Court to shape the legal limitations of the 
regulatory takings lexicon because there are many possible meanings of what it 
is to take property, and perhaps this quality of the word property dictates that it 
defy a distinct description.  Understanding the transforming nature of property 
and its role in the constitutional structure is essential to understanding the 
regulatory takings analysis and why the Court has been unable to define 
exaclty what property rights the Constitution protects.  How property comes to 
be defined in the Twenty-first Century will shape the future of the regulatory 
takings analysis. 
B. Giving and Taking 
The structure of what we label property rights “is such that the owner can 
claim they are respected by everybody in the society.”43  Property rights would 
not exist were it not for the power and protection of government,44 for it is 
underneath the power and protection of the federal government that property 
rights emanate, as the “title of the whole land is in the whole society.”45  In 
effect, government exists to establish rules that protect the claim of right to 
 
 42. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in 
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1695-96 (1988) (noting the tension in the 
constitutional property practice, the failed attempts to breakdown property into categories, and the 
possibility of a “post-liberal understanding of property”). 
 43. Ugo Mattei, Property Rights in Civil Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 157, 161 (Peter Newman ed., 2000). 
 44. PIPES, supra note 31, at 97.  Private property in the legal sense came into existence with 
the emergence of public authority, i.e. the state. 
 45. See, e.g., Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 595 (1823); 
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has indicated that property rights “are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, 
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  See also 
LOCKE, supra note 23, at § 139 (expounding a natural law theory for the existence of property 
rights and explaining that men form governments for the sake of protecting those natural rights).  
In his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, Justice Brandeis argued that a 
“restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a 
taking . . . [as] [t]he state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with 
paramount rights of the public.”  Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that there should be no taking where the restriction in question merely 
prohibits a noxious use and the property restricted still remains in the possession of its owner). 
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ownership.  It follows that there are limitations on the rights of property.  Each 
landowner is burdened somewhat by government restrictions on land use, but 
everyone also benefits from the restrictions placed on others. 
Even those landowners whose use of property is restricted might in fact 
benefit from such regulations.46  In the same way that the Fifth Amendment 
protects individuals from bearing public burdens, the opposite must be true—
fairness concerns should bar the government from allowing some people alone 
to enjoy benefits that in “all fairness and justice” should be enjoyed by the 
public as a whole.47  As opposed to the traditional view that government action 
“takes” some right from its citizens, the “givings” analysis observes that 
government not only gives protection to claims of property ownership but also 
guarantees economic value.   There must be a balance between property rights 
and the government regulation of its use. 
In lamenting the decline of property as a category of legal and political 
thought, Thomas Grey observed that “[t]he transformation of a preindustrial 
economy of private proprietors into an industrial economy . . . presupposes that 
the entrepreneurs, financiers, and lawyers who carry the process through have 
the imagination to liberate themselves from the imprisoning concept of 
property as the simple ownership of a thing by an individual person.”48  A 
meaningful conception of property might escape any rigid definition, and 
maybe we are wrong to expect such an “imprisoning” thought.  But Grey’s 
intellectual skepticism seems to deny the role that property performs in society 
by giving up on the capacity of language to capture and signify what it 
represents.49  A conception that can reassign meaning to the term “property” 
must unite the sum of rights across multiple dimensions, fusing the sticks in 
the bundle into a spatial and temporal whole.  At the same time, property must 
also be adaptable to our changing needs.  As property gives us power and 
rights and government regulates property when liberty exceeds common 
reason, perhaps the concept of property is not quite disintegrating so much as it 
is transforming from some feudal or Hohfeldian existence into a robust 
political value reflecting the nature of the market and the role of property as a 
bulwark from the overreaching of the contrasting values of liberty and power. 
 
 46. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987). 
 47. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 578 (2001) 
(arguing that government actions also can “give” value to property, usually more often than they 
“take” property). 
 48. Grey, supra note 35, at 75 (noting the obsolete thing-ownership conception of property).  
Grey argued that the “phenomenon of the ‘death of property’ breaks the connection between 
simple thing-ownership and the legal entitlements that make up the framework of the capitalist 
organization of the economy.”  Id. at 77.  He also observed that “simple thing-ownership . . . has 
been justified in classical liberal theory, and . . . in popular consciousness, as having intrinsic 
worth.”  Id. 
 49. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20-21. 
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1. The Emergence of “Smart Growth” 
The concept of city planning is not a new idea,50 but many novel ideas and 
creative strategies to arranging urban development have emerged in response 
to the environmental deterioration of America’s landscapes.  Traditionally, 
local governments have attempted to control the use of property within their 
jurisdiction through the application of zoning laws.51  While strategies to 
design and plan urban growth patterns have been based on efficiency grounds 
or were reactions to demographic changes, land-use planning has been 
implemented most recently to curb the effects of sprawling suburban regions 
and to protect environmentally sensitive areas in an era of rapidly expanding 
cities.52  In recent years, comprehensive planning schemes, sometimes called 
smart growth initiatives, have been enacted in many states attempting to take a 
more conservative and controlled approach to development and to combat the 
devastating effects of what is labeled as suburban sprawl.53  As a result of this 
 
 50. See Hart, supra note 9, 1109-31; see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
PLANNING 345-80 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the history of urban planning as a means to the creation 
of organized cities); Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. 
L. REV. 650 (1958). 
 51. One local government describes the process perfectly: 
In a society such as ours, there is a constant struggle to protect people from the acts of 
someone else.  In behavior issues, this is done by making some acts crimes. With the use 
of land, the method used to implement that protection is through land use controls. . . . All 
of these laws are designed to protect one party from the acts of another party. Yet, it is 
important to remember that protection for one party normally takes away what another 
party considers his “right”. 
City of Brentwood, Mo., What is Zoning All About?, http://www.brentwoodmo.org/ 
index.asp?ID=11 (last visited Dec. 18, 2003). 
 52. Compare Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (recognizing 
the legitimacy of modern local zoning laws), and S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1975), with OR. REV. STAT. § 197.015(14)-(16) (2001) 
(defining Portland’s Metro council, the regional urban growth planning body), and MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 15.75 (West 2001) (authorizing and encouraging regional planning); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
473.859 (West Supp. 2004) (calling for comprehensive plans to “contain an intergovernmental 
coordination element that describes how its planned land uses and urban services affect other 
communities, . . . the region, and the state . . . .”). 
 53. Smart growth policies “control where the government chooses to spend its resources” 
and “repeal an ‘insidious form of entitlement—the idea that state government has an open-ended 
obligation, regardless of where you choose to build a house or open a business, to be there to 
build’” infrastructure.  Bruce Katz, Smart Growth: The Future of the American Metropolis?, July 
2002 (London School of Economics), available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/urban/ 
publications/20021104katzlse2.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003).  See Patricia E. Salkin, The 
Smart Growth Agenda: A Snapshot of State Activity at the Turn of the Century, 21 ST. LOUIS. U. 
PUB. L. REV. 271 (2002) (canvassing state smart growth statutes and their effectiveness).  See also 
Patrick Gallagher, The Environmental, Social, and Cultural Impacts of Sprawl, 15 NATURAL 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 219, 219 (2000) (noting that what causes sprawl derives from the demands 
of the citizenry that together generate “extensive and often uncontrollable development”); James 
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war on suburban sprawl, the term “smart growth” has acquired a negative 
connotation as critics of those who support more controlled development and 
slower urban expansion have associated the movement with hindering 
economic growth and progress.54 
“Smart growth” has no exact definition, but it definitely cannot be 
characterized, like its opponents believe, as anti-growth; rather, it focuses on 
how growth occurs.55  Advocates of smart growth recognize the strain that is 
placed upon urban infrastructure, such as roads and sewer systems, when 
metropolitan areas expand at a pace beyond the capacity of the existing 
infrastructure to accommodate the needs of a growing population.  The idea is 
that such tendencies should be offset by policies that do not thwart new growth 
but rather promote responsible, measured development that conserves the 
limited resources of state and municipal governments.56  As one observer has 
noted: 
Smart growth involves a choice between areas in a locality that should be 
developed more intensely than applicable zoning allows and areas that should 
be developed far less intensely (if at all) than zoning allows.  The smart growth 
concept is a disavowal of the traditional zoning process in favor of a zoning 
process that requires very close hands-on planning . . . [and] much more 
flexible planned development.57 
Regional approaches, as opposed to action on a purely local scale, have 
been the most recent trends in government efforts to resolve the various 
problems faced by modern cities, including the lack of affordable housing, the 
 
E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits on Government Powers: Effecting 
Nature, Markets and the Quality of Life Under the Takings and Other Provisions, 9 DICK. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 421 (2001) (dissecting approaches to and implications of smart growth). 
 54. Epstein has noted: “Zoning stands in stark contrast to a system of private property, which 
allows a single owner . . . to decide how to use his plot of land.  Where property rights are 
enforced, owners can make choices on efficient land use without having to overcome the 
conundrums of collective choice.”  EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 265. 
 55. Brian W. Ohm, Reforming Land Planning Legislation at the Dawn of the 21st Century: 
The Emerging Influence of Smart Growth and Livable Communities, 32 URB. LAW. 181, 189 
(2000) (recognizing smart growth as a reaction to the pattern of development in the United States 
since World War II and also as an evolving approach to development that balances economic 
expansion with environmental protection to produce a better quality of life overall). 
 56. Such a goal is absolutely necessary as the country attempts to avoid an even deeper 
recession in the wake of the September 11th tragedy and its effects on the economy.  Many states, 
and in turn their cities, face severe budget crises as their limited resources are overextended.  It is 
imperative that a more thoughtful approach to development that considers all of the region-wide 
consequences of expansion become a priority.  See Douglas R. Porter, State Growth 
Management: The Intergovernmental Experiment, 13 PACE L. REV. 481 (1993). 
 57. John M. Armentano, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 30 REAL ESTATE L.J. 77, 78 
(2001).  The development philosophy of  “‘Smart Growth’ has become the touchstone for 
virtually all of the parties involved in the development process, from civic groups to developers 
and from environmentalists to government officials.”  Id. at 77. 
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decline of urban centers, transportation concerns, and the decreasing quality of 
the environment.58  Planning strategies have emphasized a regional approach to 
comprehensive land use designs to account for all of the consequences that 
local land use regulations can cause among neighboring jurisdictions.59  There 
has been a strong reaction, however, to sweeping land use controls that are 
used as tools for managing growth and curbing the spread of suburban 
cityscapes.60  Nonetheless, the regulation of land use by local governments 
continues to be an essential tool in dealing with the social, environmental, and 
economic consequences that are the direct result of decisions about how to use 
 
 58. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 53, at 421.  See also Porter, supra note 29.  For an 
assessment of the problems faced by comprehensive planning as a guide to rational local 
decision-making and the objectives of planning legislation to deal with the concern regarding the 
“dynamic nature of community growth and change,” see Ohm, supra note 55, at 205.  See also 
Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002) (stressing the 
need for regional government and proposing alternative approaches to deal with the problems of 
implementing and maintaining the conventional “two-tier” model of government that cannot fully 
address all of a region’s economic problems); Richard G. Lorenz, Good Fences Make Bad 
Neighbors, 33 URB. LAW. 45, 45 (2001) (arguing that states should “modify existing local 
government laws in order to facilitate principled inter-city negotiations for the purpose of 
building more effective regional communities”). 
 59. See James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New 
Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489 (1994).  See also S. 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1975) (striking down 
a system that in practice leads to exclusionary zoning, when, for example, one locality refuses to 
build a fair share of affordable housing and, in effect, forces the burden of meeting the market 
demand upon neighboring municipalities).  The current emphasis on regional concepts of 
planning and “comprehensive land use plans” results from the understanding that “[i]n reality, 
zoning at the local level has a decided impact upon the development of the region.”  DAVID H. 
MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 11 (1977) (noting that “[t]he standard zoning 
enabling legislation grants to municipalities the power to zone”).  The author observes that from 
the regional point of view it makes a big difference where “industries are located, where major 
transportation facilities are built, and where housing is provided.”  Id. at 12. 
 60. This reaction to smart growth initiatives has been seen in the state legislatures and in the 
voting booths.  See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 
158 (2001) (noting the failure of initiatives that proposed statewide growth management plans in 
Arizona and Colorado on election day 2000 and the ratification of a partial-takings measure in 
Oregon requiring compensation for all regulations that simply reduce the economic value of a 
parcel of land).  The proposed amendment to the Oregon Constitution stated: 
[I]f the government passes or enforces a regulation that restricts the use of private real 
property, and the restriction has the effect of reducing the value of property upon which 
the restriction is imposed, the property owner shall be paid just compensation equal to the 
reduction in the fair market value of the property. 
Compare id. at 169-70 (quoting OR. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) (2000)) (emphasis added), with 
Gallagher, supra note 53, at 219 (noting “voters passed 70 percent of a record 240 ballot 
initiatives relating to sprawl control” as recently as 1998).  See also Grimes, supra note 27 
(outlining a legislative response to the uncertainty of the regulatory takings analysis). 
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land.61  The extent to which such regulations might limit the use of private land 
raises questions about their validity; however, “economic development [might] 
ultimately depend[] on institutions that can protect and maintain the 
environment’s carrying capacity and resilience.”62 
2. “Entitlement Chopping”63 
In order to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred, a court 
must determine the relevant property that is affected.  As opposed to viewing a 
parcel of land in its entirety, entitlement chopping, or conceptual severance, is 
the theory that property interests in the bundle of existing property rights can 
be pulled apart when not all of the interests held by a landowner are affected 
by a regulation.64  This model of understanding requires that each regulated 
interest, no matter how small, must be compensated for by the regulator.65 
Property interests usually have many different dimensions: a physical 
dimension describing the size and shape of the property, a functional 
dimension describing the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the 
property, and a temporal dimension that describes the duration of the property 
interest.66  This doctrine therefore consists of separating, from the owner’s 
 
 61. See Amanda Siek, Comment, Smart Cities: A Detailed Look at Land Use Planning 
Techniques that are Aimed at Promoting Both Energy and Environmental Conservation, 7 ALB. 
L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 45 (2002).  See also FREILICH, supra note 28, at 209-52 (providing 
numerous examples of state statutes and policies aimed at curbing sprawl, and noting the “‘quiet 
revolution’ in land use controls”).  Freilich notes the federal government’s long history of 
encouraging sprawl through housing policies and the development of the interstate highway 
system, but he also acknowledges movement in the direction of policies that allow the federal 
government to “provide guidance and strong incentives to the states” to solve these problems.  Id. 
at 303-12.  Freilich also points out that “[s]till, the United States is the only major Western nation 
that has failed to adopt an explicit national urban growth policy.”  Id. at 303. 
 62. Susan Hanna & Mohan Munasinghe, An Introduction to Property Rights and the 
Environment, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES 
3 (Susan Hanna & Mohan Munasinghe eds., 1995) (citation omitted). 
 63. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1601 (referring to entitlement chopping as another name 
for conceptual severance). 
 64. See Herber, supra note 27, at 935-41 (making the case that Penn. Coal neither created 
any conceptual severance doctrine nor even argued the fact that if one stick in the bundle of 
property rights is extinguished, it alone is sufficient to effect a taking by noting that much of 
Holmes’s opinion was dictum considering the limited question before the Court in that case, and 
arguing that the case is important only because it affirmed the separation of the treatment of the 
eminent domain duty from the police power). 
 65. See Michelman, supra note 20, at 1614. 
 66. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 330 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting regulations are three-dimensional); Robert H. 
Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings 
Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589, 593 (2002).  In Tahoe-Sierra, petitioners argued a novel 
theory of “temporal severance,” believing that a fee interest in land could be divided into distinct 
segments, measured by time, that can be accorded a value and compensated.  Their argument 
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aggregate of rights in the property, a property interest that is comprised solely 
of just that right or interest the government action has regulated.  Then the 
aggrieved landowner may assert that a particular “whole” thing has been 
permanently taken.67  The conceptual severance theory has caused 
considerable problems in the regulatory takings context as it encourages 
property owners to focus on one stick in the bundle of property rights and to 
disregard the incidents of property ownership in society by seeking monetary 
relief from the government whenever any property right is affected.68 
The problem with the notion of conceptual severance lies in the reality that 
“any land-use regulation can be characterized as the ‘total’ deprivation of an 
aptly defined entitlement.”69  Because of this possibility, modern Supreme 
Court jurisprudence has produced mixed results, reflecting a hesitation to adopt 
a notion of property that allows a single parcel to be divided into discrete 
functional or temporal segments to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated.70  It is true that “[l]and-use regulations 
are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential 
way . . . [thus treating] them all as per se takings would transform government 
regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.”71  Therefore, the 
challenge for the future of regulatory takings jurisprudence must be to 
prioritize the protected sticks of property rights and the extent to which each is 
essentially limited. 
 
ultimately failed.  Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 327 (2002).  See also Herber, supra note 27, at 
924-25 n.75 (noting that conceptual severance goes by other names, including the “denominator 
problem”). 
 67. Carla Boyd, Comment, Temporal Severance and the Exclusion of Time in Determining 
the Economic Value of Regulated Property, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 793, 803 (2002). 
 68. This activity promotes the idea that people are somehow owed something by the 
government, or that one’s rights are more important than the rights of others.  The faithful 
listeners of conservative champion Rush Limbaugh will understand that those who think this way 
are a part of the ever-expanding class of what he labels the “entitlement culture,” a dangerous 
faction of our society that believes the American public owes them something for every alleged 
“harm” they suffer. 
 69. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1614. 
 70. See Boyd, supra note 67, 803-04 (noting that “[d]efining the property in a regulatory 
takings analysis is a[] . . . contentious undertaking” and that the Tahoe-Sierra case will provide 
the Court the opportunity to clarify what the “relevant parcel” is for the purpose of the takings 
inquiry).  Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) and Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (rejecting conceptual severance), 
with First English, 482 U.S. 304 (requiring just compensation for a taking that was unchallenged 
before the Supreme Court, but was arguably based on a notion of temporal severance).  See also 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001). 
 71. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002).  Accord Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 39, 
413 (1922)  (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could 
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”). 
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C. A Brief History of Takings 
As such, modern litigation involving the Takings Clause has produced a 
labyrinth of decisions often based on imprecise standards and vague 
interpretations.  Many people are undoubtedly apprehensive upon entering this 
area of law.  This Comment has emphasized the important function that 
property plays in balancing that boundary between the rights of property 
owners and other individuals as well as between the government and the 
governed.  While the development of regulatory takings jurisprudence has been 
well documented, a brief outline of some of the major cases in the 
development of this puzzle might be helpful in understanding its complex 
nature.72 
1. The First Two Hundred Years 
The framers were familiar with legislative land use regulations, for many 
land use controls were passed after our country’s independence and before the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791.73  The Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence has been based on the understanding that the takings clause 
prohibits “[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”74 
Takings jurisprudence has distinguished in kind its analysis of physical and 
regulatory takings. “[S]o long as these regulations do not require the 
[landowner] to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his [property] by 
a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally 
 
 72. See Haar & Wolf, supra note 8, at 2162 n.13 (citing numerous examples among the 
plethoric commentary about regulatory takings jurisprudence and categorizing five classes of the 
literature as the “classics” (exploring the tension between public need and private right), the 
“expansionists” (advocating the preclusion of a wide range of regulation), the “reactions” (to the 
most recent Supreme Court case), the “outside-the-boxes” (attempting to reconceptualize the 
entire notion), and the “muddlers” (exasperating the hopelessly confused state of takings law)).  
For a review of the development of the law of regulatory takings and the relevance of the Tahoe-
Sierra decision, see Jordan C. Kahn, Lake Tahoe Clarity Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court 
Advances Land Use Planning in Tahoe-Sierra, ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J., FALL 2002, at 
33; Danaya C. Wright & Nissa Laughner, Shaken, Not Stirred: Has Tahoe-Sierra Settled or 
Muddied the Regulatory Takings Waters?, 32 ENVTL. LAW. REP. 11177 (2002); David L. Callies 
& Calvert G. Chipchase, Moratoria and Musings on Regulatory Takings: Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 279 (2003). 
 73. See Herber, supra note 27, at 921 (observing that the notion of regulatory takings did not 
exist from 1791 to 1922).  Also, scholars have noted that “[i]f someone as articulate as Madison 
had wanted to restrict the regulation of land use . . . he would have done so unmistakably.”  Id. at 
944-45 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).  See also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law 
and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996). 
 74. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)). 
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applicable to nonpossessory government activity.”75  The rationale for this 
doctrine is justified by the widely held belief that though the total deprivation 
of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s perspective, the equivalent of a 
physical appropriation,76 they are two separate kinds of takings, subject to a 
different approach―an idea that is fleshed out in Tahoe-Sierra.77  In one case, 
the government uses its eminent domain authority to physically take property, 
while in the regulatory context, an allegedly injured property owner must 
assert his rights by instituting an inverse condemnation proceeding.78  It is now 
well-established jurisprudence that government land use regulations might so 
severely overstep the bounds of the police power so as to effect a taking 
requiring compensation to the aggrieved landowner.79 
The origin of the modern prohibition against certain regulations has been 
traced to the regulatory zoning approaches of the expanding urban areas of the 
World War I era and to Justice Holmes’s opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. 
Mahon.80  Justice Holmes stated that “if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.81  In 1978, the Supreme Court attempted to modernize 
the enigmatic statements inherited from Justice Holmes by fleshing out the law 
of regulatory takings into a list of factors to be considered in the takings 
 
 75. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).  See also 
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 (“jurisprudence involving . . . physical takings is as old as the 
Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules.”). 
 76. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992). 
 77. 535 U.S. at 321-25 (2002).  The Court observed that the Fifth Amendment itself provides 
a basis for drawing this distinction, distinguishing the plain language that requires the payment of 
compensation whenever the government acquires private property from the fact that the 
Constitution itself makes no reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making 
certain uses of her private property.  Id. 
 78. “The phrase ‘inverse condemnation’ generally describes a cause of action against a 
government defendant in which a landowner may recover just compensation for a ‘taking’ of 
property under the Fifth Amendment, even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise 
of the sovereign’s power of eminent domain have not been instituted by the government entity.”  
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 638 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980)). 
 79. Justice Scalia has observed, “We have never set forth the justification for this [regulatory 
takings] rule.  Perhaps it is simply . . . that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the 
landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 
(citations omitted).  Perhaps the justification can be seen when there is differential treatment 
among property owners, such that “the police power has become a cloak for illegitimate ends 
whose influence overwhelms the stated reasons” for regulation.  EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 133. 
 80. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 81. Id. at 415.  In Penn. Coal, the Court acknowledged that a governmental body may take 
property by appropriating land and taking physical possession of it under the power of eminent 
domain, and it might also violate the Takings Clause by regulating property so much under the 
police power so as to effectively render it worthless to the owner.  See Herber, supra note 27, at 
935-41. 
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analysis to determine more precisely when a regulation has gone too far.  The 
Court laid out three aspects of a fact-specific analysis that have particular 
significance when inquiring into the question of whether or not a compensable 
taking has occurred because of a government regulation: (1) the character of 
the government action; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with 
distinct, investment-backed expectations, and (3) the economic impact of the 
regulation.82  After it outlined the factors to be considered in the regulatory 
takings analysis, the Supreme Court declared that a complete examination of 
whether a government regulation is a taking also requires a two-part test.  
Thus, the Fifth Amendment is violated when a regulation of land use “does not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land.”83 
The Court’s 1987 Term epitomized the reinvigorated support of individual 
property rights.  The Court heard numerous takings cases in an attempt to more 
clearly define the law of regulatory takings for aggrieved landowners.84  
During that Term, the Court endeavored to define the denominator for 
 
 82. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 83. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, 261-62 (citations omitted) (holding that a zoning ordinance was 
not a taking because, though it restricted the use of appellants’ five-acre tract of land with a view 
of the San Francisco Bay to allow the development of only one house per acre, the land was not 
deprived of all economically valid use, and noting the importance of the requirement that the 
government justification for the action must substantially advance a legitimate state interest); see 
also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).  Agins held that 
mere fluctuations in market value during governmental decision-making, absent bad faith, do not 
constitute a taking.  Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9. 
 84. The “1987 Takings Trilogy” includes: Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. 470; First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (holding that 
temporary takings are not different in kind from permanent takings and where such a taking is 
already found, compensation is required); and Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 
841-42 (1987) (holding that a condition to building that required landowners to grant a public 
access easement across their property does not serve a “rational relation” to any government 
interest and constitutes a taking).  See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Keystone Bituminous Coal, First 
English and Nollan: A Framework for Accommodation?, 34 WASH U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 
173 (1988).  See also Michelman, supra note 20.  One author noted that while the Court did give 
more attention to landowner cases in the 1980s, property owners suffered “repeated defeats [that] 
may only serve to emphasize the inferior status of landowner rights.”  DENNIS J. COYLE, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH LAND USE 
REGULATION 175 (1993) (providing a table showing that landowners won only thirty percent of 
the time in Supreme Court decisions on constitutional rights of landowners). 
  Some have argued that First English established the use of the “temporal severance 
doctrine” in determining if a taking exists.  In the words of the First English Court, however, it 
“merely [held] that where the government’s activities have already worked a taking of all use of 
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide 
compensation.”  First English, 482 U.S. at 321.  See also Thomas E. Roberts, Moratoria as 
Categorical Regulatory Takings: What First English and Lucas Say and Don’t Say, 31 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 11037 (2001). 
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purposes of the so-called “deprivation fraction.”85  The denominator problem 
arises in takings cases where the property owner’s entire parcel is not 
completely taken, though a distinct portion of his property rights, whether of 
actual land or some economic value that might be severable, might have been 
taken.86  Because the test for regulatory takings requires the courts to compare 
the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in 
the property, the critical question is to determine how to define the unit of 
property “whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.”87  This 
critical question has led to a divide on the Court, and among scholars as well, 
between those who advocate looking at the “parcel as a whole,” and those who 
would view any deprivation of or limitation on any strand in the metaphorical 
“bundle of sticks” as the property right against which the allegedly 
unconstitutional regulation is to be measured. 
2. Drawing a Line in the Sand: The Challenge to Develop Unequivocal 
Rules 
The property rights movement reached its peak with a victory in the 
landmark decision Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.88  Justice Scalia’s 
 
 85. See Michelman, supra note 13, at 1192.  Professor Michelman observed that Penn. 
Coal’s diminution in value test calls for a fractional comparison between the loss in value of the 
property affected by the regulation (the numerator) and the preexisting value of the property (the 
denominator) to determine the extent of the deprivation and a determination of whether the 
regulation has gone “too far.”  He noted that such an analysis raised the problematic question of 
“how to define the ‘particular thing’ whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.”  
Id.  For an analysis of the benefits fraction, see Benjamin Allee, Note, Drawing the Line in 
Regulatory Takings Law: How a Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the 
Denominator Problem, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1957, 2013-14 (2002) (observing that segmenting 
an individual’s property funnels claims into the Lucas rule without considering the fairness 
principle that is the basis for regulatory takings law).  See also John E. Fee, Comment, 
Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994). 
 86. Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 
663, 679 n.79 (1996).  The Court first confronted this problem in Penn Central, though it did not 
recognize any takings fraction.  In that case, it measured the effect of a given regulation on a 
whole parcel of land, not on individual strands of affected property rights.  See Penn Central, 438 
U.S. 104.  The Penn Central Court measured the effect of the regulation against the entire 
property interest of the property owner and refused to characterize New York’s Historic 
Preservation Act as taking the rights of an interest in the air above Grand Central Station that 
would have severed such right from the property parcel as a whole.  Id. at 130.  The Court also 
limited the characterization of the denominator by refusing to take into account the whole 
property owned by the landowner in the city, noncontiguous to the parcel at issue, when 
considering against what property to measure the regulation and determine if there had been a 
total taking.  Id. 
 87. Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 497 (citing Michelman, supra note 13, at 1192). 
 88. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  Lucas was significant in effecting “basic changes in . . . the 
constitutional definition of private property itself.”  See Michael J. Davis, Lucas and Takings: 
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opinion for the Court articulated the “categorical taking” in the regulatory 
context—a per se rule establishing that a taking occurs whenever a regulation 
deprives the landowner of “all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land.”89  A taking in the Lucas sense is categorical in that the courts will not 
balance the importance of the public interest advanced by the regulation 
against the regulation’s imposition on private property rights.90  Rather, it is 
enough that the regulation has the effect of taking all of the economic use out 
of the property.91  But determining when all of the potential economic use has 
been taken from the regulated property has proven difficult to establish, and 
the results of such an inquiry inevitably rest on the way the property interest is 
quantified.92  Thus, whether or not an owner has been deprived of all 
economically beneficial or productive use of his property ultimately depends 
upon how the property is defined.93 
Though the denominator problem does not arise in a case where the 
property owner’s entire parcel is deprived of all economically beneficial use 
because (even using the largest possible denominator, the regulation’s effect 
would be a 100% diminution in value) defining the property interest against 
which regulations are to be measured was still a central concern.  Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in Lucas also made clear, though, that a regulation that 
deprives property of all economically viable use could be upheld where the 
economically viable use would have violated state nuisance law or background 
priciples of state property law.94  The uncompromising categorical rule 
 
Private Property Redefined, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1993, at 83 (noting the “brave new 
world of takings law” ushered in by the decision). 
 89. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.  Residential developer owner David Lucas was prohibited from 
developing any structures on two beachfront lots on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island near 
Charleston, South Carolina.  The state’s Beachfront Management Act, which was enacted after 
Lucas purchased his property, prohibited development on certain lands to protect tidelands, 
beaches, and oceanfront sand dunes.  See Jennifer Dick & Andrew Chandler, Shifting Sands: The 
Implementation of Lucas on the Evolution of Takings Law and South Carolina’s Application of 
the Lucas Rule, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 637, 651-52 (2002); see also Paul Turner & Sam 
Kalen, Takings and Beyond: Implications for Regulation, 19 ENERGY L.J. 25, 30-32 (1998) 
(noting that Courts are being asked more than ever before to “resolve the balance between 
preserving effective regulatory control options and protecting private property”). 
 90. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
“‘[C]ategorical’ [means] those ‘categories of regulatory action [that are] compensable without 
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.”  Good v. 
United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015). 
 91. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. 
 92. See id. at 1015. 
 93. Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the “deprivation of all economically 
valuable use” of property cannot be determined objectively). 
 94. Id. at 1029-30.  These are the two exceptions to the categorical rule.  See, e.g., Todd D. 
Brody, Comment, Examining the Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause: Is There Life for 
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championed in Lucas is an exception to the general rule and reveals a turning 
away from the multi-factor analysis toward developing a more unequivocal 
rule similar to the class of physical appropriation cases. 
The fragmented decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island exemplified the 
divide on the Court between those who preferred the application of rules 
favoring property interests and those who stressed the importance of balancing 
all relevant interests in deciding a takings case.95  The case emphasized the 
notion that Lucas’ categorical rule is to be applied only in extreme 
circumstances, affirming that it is “[a] complex of factors including the 
regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the 
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action” that should be used for determining 
whether a regulation goes “too far” when the “regulation places limitations on 
land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use.”96  The 
divided Palazzolo Court upheld the ripeness of a landowner’s takings claim,97 
allowing the courts to decide the question of whether the owner is deprived of 
all economic use of his property when a substantial reduction in value of only 
portions of the land occurs.98  Because the contiguous parcel of property 
retained at least some economic use and value, the Supreme Court remanded 
the claim for further analysis, refusing to characterize the denominator of the 
deprivation fraction as solely the slice of the property that was affected by the 
government regulation.99  The plurality held that the fact that a landowner took 
title to the land after the enactment of a regulation depriving the land of some 
 
Environmental Regulations After Lucas?, 4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 287 (1993); Richard A. 
Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1369 (1993). 
 95. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 96. Id. at 617 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 97. Id. at 632.  Aside from determining when a taking has occurred, the Supreme Court has 
also been troubled with the ripeness of takings claims, often forcing landowners to exhaust all 
potentially effective procedural remedies before bringing a takings claim to court.  The Court 
attempted to balance protection for landowners’ constitutional rights with the avoidance of 
wasting judicial resources by encouraging negotiation in requiring landowners to pursue 
variances and submit multiple permit applications to regulatory bodies before their claims 
become ripe.  See generally Thomas E. Roberts, Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A 
Procedural Loose End, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 623 (2002).  See also William M. Hof, Note, Trying 
to Halt the Procedural Merry-Go-Round: The Ripeness of Regulatory Takings Claims After 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 833 (2002). 
 98. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616. 
 99. Id.  The statute at issue authorized the State of Rhode Island to create the Rhode Island 
Coastal Resources Management Council and delegated to the Council the authority to promulgate 
regulations restricting the use of coastal lands.  Id. at 640-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  The Council’s regulations effectively foreclosed the petitioner from filling his 
wetlands to develop the property.  Id.  In this case, the petitioner attempted to assert that, because 
he was restricted from development of some of his property, there was a taking.  Id. at 616. 
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value would not automatically preclude the landowner from prevailing on a 
takings claim.100 
The Palazzolo case is a significant precursor to Tahoe-Sierra as it outlined 
the intellectual struggle between those Justices who want to avoid “sweeping 
rule[s]”101 and desire to “restore[] balance to that [takings] inquiry”102 by 
realizing that the “outcome instead ‘depends largely on the particular 
circumstances’” of each case,103 and those who want to avoid the 
“(unspecified) circumstances”104 associated with an indeterminate “pursui[t of] 
abstract ‘fairness’”105 by seeking more “mathematically precise variables.”106  
In fact, Palazzolo predicted battles to come as Justices Scalia and O’Connor 
provided separate concurrences that each advocated fundamentally different 
approaches to the takings inquiry. 
While the Lucas decision outlined the Court’s uncompromising approach 
to the chaotic law of regulatory takings, Palazzolo represented the reluctance 
of some to avoid adoption of any hard line method for determining when a 
regulation goes “too far.”107  It is at this point in the evolution of takings 
jurisprudence that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit for 
the Tahoe-Sierra case in order to answer the question of whether a regulation 
imposing a temporary, though seemingly indefinite, moratorium on 
development constituted a per se taking of property.108 
 
 100. Id. at 630. 
 101. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 635. 
 103. Id. at 633 (noting the “less than fully determinate” nature of the concepts of “fairness 
and justice” that underlie the Takings Clause, and showing disdain for any “set formula” that 
determines when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by regulations be 
compensated by the government) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
 104. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 105. Id. at 636. 
 106. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 107. See id. at 633, 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “[o]ur polestar . . . remains the 
principles set forth in Penn Central itself” and that “[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per 
se rules in either direction must be resisted.”).  See also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002) 
(“‘generally eschew[ing]’ any set formula for determining how far is too far, choosing instead to 
engage in ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’”) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)). 
 108. See 533 U.S. 948, 948 (2001).  The Court granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit to 
answer the following question: “Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a 
temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring 
compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution?”  Id. 
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III.  TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL V. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING 
AGENCY109 
In April 2002, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in the Tahoe-
Sierra case, more than two decades after the first lawsuit was initiated by 
aggrieved landowners against Lake Tahoe’s regional regulatory authority.110  
The majority specifically adopted the Penn Central approach that requires a 
balancing of multiple factors over the hard and fast per se rules as the 
controlling paradigm in the regulatory takings analysis.111  The case also 
reinforces the importance of modern land-use planning.  The majority upheld 
the use of moratoria as a legitimate tool to halt potentially harmful 
development while a more permanent and environmentally responsible 
strategy could be developed for the region.112  In fact, in an era of cynicism 
concerning government regulations limiting land use, Tahoe-Sierra 
represented “the first clear-cut victory for the government side in a land use or 
environmental takings case before the [nation’s highest] Court in [fifteen] 
years.”113 
Perhaps the most important outcome of the Tahoe-Sierra decision, 
however, is the characterization of property the majority implicitly adopted 
that underlies the framework of its analysis of regulatory takings.  Ultimately, 
the Court defined property for the purposes of the Takings Clause as an idea 
that includes all aspects of the term and recognized its importance in the 
concept of ordered liberty.114  The Court required that in applying the 
regulatory takings analysis, the property must be considered together, and 
 
 109. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 110. The first opinion in the case history of Tahoe-Sierra was published almost two decades 
before the final decision was reached by the Supreme Court.  See 611 F. Supp. 110 (D. Nev. 
1985).  In fact, the petitioners filed suit approximately two months after the adoption of the 1984 
regional plan for the Basin, and their complaints gave rise to protracted litigation that produced 
four opinions by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and several published District Court 
opinions.  See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 313, 313 n.6.  But the tale of this litigation continues.  
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.  v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
  For an analysis of the “Long and Winding Legal Road,” see J. David Breemer, 
Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and its Quiet Ending in 
the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8-12, 54-55 (2002) (noting as 
“disconcerting” the “procedural quagmire” that allowed for barriers to relief, and also noting the 
missed opportunity by both the Court and the landowners to expand upon the Penn Central 
analysis).  Breemer, sympathetic to the claims of the landowners, concludes that the “regulatory 
actions have destroyed the dreams of real people, whose lives encompass a small, but . . . 
meaningful, slice of the temporal whole.”  Id. at 55. 
 111. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322. 
 112. See id. at 341-42. 
 113. John D. Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings 
Decision, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11235 (2002). 
 114. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302. 
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sticks in the bundle should not be severed from the whole property interest.  
Though the decision has drawn much criticism, it may yet prove to be the best 
outcome.  In the end, the Court left room for modification, recognizing that in 
the exchange between power and liberty, the meaning of property for purposes 
of the Fifth Amendment transforms as the balance between liberty and 
authority requires in order to reflect fairness and justice.115 
A. Lake Tahoe: “A Noble Sheet of Blue Water”116 
Lake Tahoe is an ancient body of water some twenty-five million years old 
and is situated more than 6000 feet above sea level on the border of California 
and Nevada.117  Lake Tahoe’s exceptional clarity, because of the lack of 
nitrogen and phosphorous in the water, has created a rare natural beauty.118  In 
fact, only two other sizable lakes in the world are of comparable quality to this 
high Sierran lake, but Lake Tahoe is the only one that is “so readily accessible 
from large metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to urban development.”119 
Rapid population growth and land use around Lake Tahoe in the 1950s and 
1960s led to increased development that would ultimately begin to stress the 
 
 115. See id. at 342. 
 116. TWAIN, supra note 33, at 169, cited in Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230-31 (D. 
Nev. 1999).  Recounting his travels from a small Missouri town on the Mississippi River to the 
American West, Twain, upon reaching Lake Tahoe, observed: 
[A]t last the lake burst upon us—a noble sheet of blue water lifted six thousand three 
hundred feet above the level of the sea, and walled in by a rim of snow-clad mountain 
peaks that towered aloft a full three thousand feet higher still! It was a vast oval . . . . As it 
lay there with the shadows of the mountains brilliantly photographed upon its still surface 
I thought it must surely be the fairest picture the whole earth affords. 
TWAIN, supra note 33, at 169. 
 117. See Geography & History Overview, Lake Tahoe Data Clearinghouse, Western 
Geographic Science Center, at http://tahoe.usgs.gov/geography.html (last modified January 16, 
2003) [hereinafter Geography and History Overview]; see also Herber, supra note 27, at 913-14.  
It has been explained that: 
The Lake Tahoe Basin was formed by geologic block faulting about 2 to 3 million years 
ago. The down-dropping of the Basin and the uplifting of the adjacent mountains resulted 
in a dramatic topographic relief in the region.  The mountain peaks rise to more than 
10,000 ft (3,048 m) above sea level, and the surface of Lake Tahoe has an average 
elevation of about 6,225 ft (1,897 m).” 
Geography and History Overview, supra.  For further information on the attributes of and history 
surrounding Lake Tahoe, see GEORGE WHARTON JAMES, THE LAKE OF THE SKY: LAKE TAHOE 
IN THE HIGH SIERRAS OF CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA (1928). 
 118. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307.  The lack of chemicals that nourish the growth of algae 
makes the lake oligotrophic.  Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231. 
 119. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307 n.2 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-510, at 3-4 (1969)).  Only 
Crater Lake in nearby southwest Oregon and Lake Baikal in Russia are of similar oligotrophic 
quality.  Id. 
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lake environment.120  Though development is often associated with progress, 
eventually the lake’s clarity and beauty would be compromised because the 
upsurge in development, as in most urbanized regions, caused an increase in 
what is known as “impervious coverage” of the land.121  Impervious coverage 
(which includes such common aspects of development like asphalt, concrete, 
buildings, and even packed dirt) prevents precipitation from being absorbed by 
the soil and subsequently creates large amounts of flowing water that can have 
more erosive force than individual raindrops scattered over a dispersed area.122  
The intensified runoff because of the earnest development of the Lake Tahoe 
Basin began to cause increased nutrient loading of the lake and its pristine 
condition began to deteriorate rapidly.123  The District Court noted that “unless 
the process is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and trademark blue 
color . . . [and] [e]stimates are that, should the lake turn green, it could take 
over 700 years for it to return to its natural state, if that were ever possible at 
all.”124 
The Lake Tahoe Basin occupies five hundred and one square miles and 
was shared by five counties, several municipalities, and the Forest Service of 
the Federal Government until the two state legislatures, subject to 
congressional approval, adopted the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in 
1969 (the Compact).  The Compact created the Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency (TRPA), appointing it “to coordinate and regulate development in the 
Basin and to conserve its natural resources.”125  Because there were numerous 
exceptions that did not significantly limit the construction of residential 
housing and in effect exacerbated the predicament, the two states eventually 
adopted an extensive amendment to the Compact in 1980.126  The TRPA was 
 
 120. Id.  “During the last half-century, increased human activity in the lake basin has caused 
the lake’s clarity to decrease at a rate of about 1 foot per year (30 cm/yr).”  Geography and 
History Overview, supra note 117. 
 121. Herber, supra note 27, at 914; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308. 
 122. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226-31 (D. Nev. 1999). 
 125. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309 (quoting Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 394 (1979)).  See also Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969).  
This is the original Tahoe Regional Compact of 1969, a regional consortium of multiple 
jurisdictions formed to handle the severity of the problems caused because of the increase in 
growth in the area after World War II.  It was considered a failure throughout the 1970s as the 
lake’s clarity continued to decline and the rate of development, particularly the creation of 
subdivisions, continued to intensify.  Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309. 
 126. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980).  See also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309-10.  
The TRPA is an example of the emerging intergovernmental approach to land use planning and 
other region-wide problems.  See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (highlighting 
emerging models of regional planning agencies created to confront widespread problems on a 
broader scale). 
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directed in the early 1980s to adopt a comprehensive regional plan that would 
achieve and maintain environmental threshold carrying capacities for sensitive 
lands throughout the multiple jurisdictions in which the Lake Tahoe Basin sits 
where development has caused the greatest harm to the surrounding 
environment.127 
The 1980 amendments to the Compact, in an attempt to control the effects 
of irresponsible development, provided “that in order to make effective the 
regional plan as revised by [TRPA], it is necessary to halt temporarily works of 
development in the region which might otherwise absorb the entire capability 
of the region for further development or direct it out of harmony with the 
ultimate plan.”128  The TRPA, realizing that the enormous task it was presented 
with could not be completed by the deadlines required in the Compact, enacted 
the infamous Ordinance 81-5, imposing the first moratoria on development that 
would be challenged in court.129  The Ordinance prohibited the placement of 
impervious coverage within certain “land capability districts” that the TRPA 
had defined as “Stream Environmental Zones” (SEZs).  These SEZs were areas 
already naturally prone to runoff and where conservation efforts had focused 
on controlling growth in order to curb the likelihood of erosion in those 
areas.130 
The interim moratoria on development was to remain in effect until the 
adoption of the more permanent “ultimate plan” that was required by the 
Compact to achieve and maintain those carrying capacities within the 
region.131  The Compact assigned the TRPA the complex task of defining the 
“environmental thresholds carrying capacities” of lands in the Basin within 
eighteen months.  Within one year after the adoption of these standards, the 
TRPA was to adopt a new regional plan.132  Having failed to adopt a regional 
plan within the time specified by the Compact, the TRPA approved another 
resolution in the late summer of 1983 that “completely suspended all project 
reviews and approvals” and would remain in effect until a new regional plan 
 
 127. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309. 
 128. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. at 3243.  The 1980 Compact declared: “The waters of Lake 
Tahoe and other resources of the region are threatened with deterioration or degeneration, which 
endangers the natural beauty and economic productivity of the region.”  Pub. L. No. 96-551, art. I 
§ (a)(1), 94 Stat. 3233 (1980). 
 129. This is the first of two moratoria implemented in the region, and it became effective on 
August 21, 1981.  Upon failing to define “environmental threshold carrying capacities” (because 
of a division of opinion within TRPA’s governing board and other political differences) for more 
than one year, by the terms of the Compact between the states, the TRPA was given one more 
year to adopt a new regional plan.  See Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. at 3240. 
 130. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308. 
 131. Id. at 310. 
 132. Id. 
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was adopted.133  The new regional plan was finally approved in April 1984, but 
on that same day, the State of California was granted an injunction enjoining 
the regional plan from being implemented on the ground that it “failed to 
establish land-use controls sufficiently stringent to protect the Basin.”134  This 
injunction remained effective until a revised plan was adopted in 1987.135  
Thus, many landowners were prohibited from developing on their property for 
six years.136 
B. The Majority Approves the Moratoria 
The Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra was asked by the petitioners to 
evaluate the question of “[w]hether the Court of Appeals properly determined 
that a temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking 
of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United 
States Constitution.”137  In Tahoe-Sierra, the majority refused to apply the 
Lucas per se rule to the developmental moratorium.138  The Court noted that 
the categorical exception to the “parcel as a whole rule” adopted in Lucas is 
reserved for “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or 
economically beneficial use of land is permitted.”139  A solid majority declared 
that the answer to whether the Takings Clause requires compensation when 
government enacts a temporary, though perhaps indefinite, regulation denying 
property owners all viable economic use of real property is to be decided by 
applying and balancing the multiple factors announced in Penn Central, not by 
 
 133. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 311.  Because a new regional plan would not be adopted until 
April 26, 1984, Resolution 83-21 was a seemingly indefinite moratorium.  It ended up being an 
additional eight-month suspension prohibiting development on high hazard lands in the Basin, 
thus resulting in a moratorium that lasted for thirty-two months.  See id. at 311-12. 
 134. Id. at 312 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1236). 
 135. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1236 (D. Nev. 1999). 
 136. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 338 n.34.  Arguably, the TRPA was responsible for only the 
first thirty-two months of the prohibition on development, as it was the authority that issued the 
moratoria.  The majority in Tahoe-Sierra accepts this argument and disregards the final three 
years that allowed no development, noting that it was the District Court that issued the 1984 
injunction and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that upheld its validity.  See id. at 346 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 137. 533 U.S. 948 (2001) (granting certiorari to the Supreme Court).  The Supreme Court 
explained that throughout the earlier protracted litigation and decisions, the “temporary 
moratorium” referred to only two things: Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21.  See Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 313 n.8. 
 138. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330.  The Lucas rule states that any government action that 
renders property valueless—regardless of its fundamental character, but taking into account such 
amorphous common law concepts as the “background principles of [state property law]” and 
general principles of nuisance—is a taking under the Fifth Amendment.  Lucas v. S. C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992). 
 139. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017); see also Cane Tenn., 
Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 105 (2002). 
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applying any uncompromising, categorical rule.140  So although the Court’s 
physical takings jurisprudence involves the straightforward application of per 
se rules, the Tahoe-Sierra holding confirms that the regulatory takings analysis 
is to be characterized by “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”141 that are 
designed to allow a “careful examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances.”142 
As part of the rationale for the decision, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion 
noted that “[a] rule [requiring] compensation for every delay in the use of 
property would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive 
or encourage hasty decisionmaking.”143  This view suggests a swing in the 
pendulum moving the Court’s jurisprudence away from the view of an absolute 
right to use one’s property towards the recognition that such use is necessarily 
limited to some extent.  It also recognizes that a plot of land is not an island, a 
notion that is essential to any proper definition of property.  With sufficient 
time, the land use planning process “may be permitted to run its full and 
natural course with widespread citizen input and involvement, public debate, 
and full consideration of all issues and points of view.”144  The Court’s holding 
indicates that a proper analysis of whether a regulation effects a taking should 
involve a balancing between the interests of the property owner that are 
affected and the nature of the government action, rather than focusing solely on 
the economic effects of the regulation.  Declining to adopt the proposed per se 
rule for temporary regulatory takings, the Court noted that it did not “hold that 
the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a 
taking; [it] simply recognize[d] that it should not be given exclusive 
significance one way or the other.”145  Consequently, when a regulation does 
not deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his land, the 
courts should perform a “more fact specific inquiry” to determine whether a 
 
 140. The majority stated: 
[T]he answer to the abstract question whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking is 
neither ‘yes, always’ nor ‘no, never;’ the answer depends upon the particular 
circumstances of the case.  Resisting ‘[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per se 
rules in either direction,’ . . . we conclude that the circumstances in this case are best 
analyzed within the Penn Central framework. 
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 141. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 142. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 143. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335.  See also Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 
(1922) (noting that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”). 
 144. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 338 n.33 (citations omitted).  The Court in Tahoe-Sierra also 
noted that throughout the planning process for developing a workable strategy to save Lake 
Tahoe from environmental degradation, the landowners and TRPC had ample opportunity to be 
heard and in fact were heard either in person or in writing at every hearing.  Id. at 340 n.35. 
 145. Id. at 337. 
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regulatory taking has occurred.146  When done properly, such an analysis 
should include a Penn Central inquiry into all relevant circumstances of a 
particular case.147 
Tahoe-Sierra is a clear victory for land-use planning advocates, signaling 
an unambiguous shift against the property rights ideology and the Lucas 
decision that represented its zenith.  But although the Court affirms the use of 
the Penn Central factors as a guide to the takings inquiry, an opportunity was 
noticeably missed to break-down the intricate regulatory takings analysis and 
make such an examination more fully determinate.148  For example, a factor 
analysis is the approach endorsed by the current Court, but the majority failed 
to state which, if any, of the factors is dispositive or even carries the most 
weight.149  In failing to develop the balancing test, observers are free to 
speculate as to the reasons behind the majority’s omission.  Without any 
clarification on this matter, the Court might inadvertently encourage litigation 
because planners and property owners, not to mention lower court judges and 
attorneys, will be unable to accurately predict the manner in which the 
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries will be made.150 
 
 146. Id. at 332. 
 147. Id. at 334. 
 148. See Echeverria, supra note 113, at 11245 (observing that the Tahoe-Sierra decision 
placed a new emphasis on the multi-factor framework, but it provides little guidance on what the 
Penn Central test actually is or how it would be applied). 
 149. See Berst v. Snohomish County, 57 P.3d 273, 279-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (under the 
authority of Tahoe-Sierra and Penn Central, though the landowners made a claim that regulations 
interfered with their investment-backed expectations and caused them to suffer detrimental 
economic impact, the court refused to adopt the “novel analyses” that the “imposition of a 
moratorium in the absence of due process rights constitutes an unconstitutional taking”). 
 150. See Joel R. Burcat & Julia M. Glencer, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency: Is There a There There?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11212, 11217, 11220 
(2002).  The authors stated, “Tahoe-Sierra serves only to reinforce that it will still be some time 
before a regulated person can determine when a regulation has . . . ‘gone too far’ and effected a 
taking of private property.  If anything, the Court’s emphasis in Tahoe-Sierra on the case-by-case 
evaluation to be made under Penn Central leaves the fate of takings claims more uncertain than 
ever.”  Id. at 11220 (citations omitted).  The article notes also that the Penn Central “test itself is 
far from ‘familiar’” and “defies predictability” because “no in-depth analysis of Penn Central’s 
component parts has ever accompanied these recitations.”  Id. at 11217 (citations omitted).  See 
also Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 504, 520 n.47 (2002) (not explicitly 
discussing the Penn Central factors in finding no taking because of a belief that “the facts and 
circumstances as a whole prove there was no taking,” and basing its failure to do so on an in-
depth analysis on Tahoe-Sierra).  On the other hand, the notion that property interests are 
severable and subject to takings will arguably produce much more litigation. 
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C. The Doomsday Dissent: “In the Long Run, We are all Dead”151 
The three justices who dissented fundamentally differed from the majority 
because they refused to adopt the “parcel as a whole” conception of property.  
Additionally, they would have found that the regulations effected a taking 
because a temporal slice of the owners property interests was taken when the 
moratoria was in place.152  Noting that petitioners were prohibited from 
building any structures on their land for “over half a decade,” the dissent by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist reflected his belief that the moratorium on 
development required the payment of compensation because it “deprive[d the 
land] owners of all economically viable use of their land,” thus falling within 
the established categorical rule.153  In his view, the moratorium lasted too long, 
and under the prior precedent established in Lucas and First English, the 
temporary development restrictions could not be considered a legitimate 
“traditional land-use planning device.”154  Also, the regulations could not 
properly be associated with the “short-term delays attendant to zoning and 
permit regimes [that] are a longstanding feature of state property law and part 
of a landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.”155 
The dissent acknowledged the nuisance exception to Lucas’s categorical 
rule and the realization that “since the beginning of our regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, we have recognized that property rights ‘are enjoyed under an 
 
 151. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN MAYNARD 
KEYNES, MONETARY REFORM 88 (1924)).  See also PIPES, supra note 31, at 250-51 (calling 
increased environmental protection the result of a Cold War-like “doomsday scenario” and 
observing that “[e]nvironmental hysteria . . . provides a powerful emotional rationale for 
encroachments on property rights” that “must be sacrificed for the sake of survival of life on 
earth.”)  The same emotional rationale might be seen in the ardor of the property rights 
movement, which has experienced an increased popularity based seemingly on the absurd notion 
that environmental quality must be unavoidably sacrificed for the sake of the absolute free use of 
land in the name of economic progress or “liberty.”  The movement appeals to emotion by 
perpetuating the idea that supporting even moderate government protection of the environment 
could cause the downfall of America. 
 152. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343-44 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 343. 
 154. Id.  But see Roberts, supra note 84, at 11037 (arguing that land use moratoria are an 
integral and rational part of land-use planning and permitting, “[p]roperly conducted planning 
activities take time” and “rational planning often requires a temporary restraint on land uses” such 
that the “mere fact of a delay cannot on its face be found to be a taking without eliminating the 
entire permitting process”). 
 155. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  In fact, 
the dissent noted that “California, where much of the land . . . is located, provides that a 
moratorium ‘shall be of no further force and effect 45 days from its date of adoption,’ and caps 
extension of the moratorium so that the total duration cannot exceed two years.”  Id. at 353 
(citations omitted).  Arguably, however, the state gave up much of its authority over the land in 
the Basin when it entered into the congressionally approved Tahoe Regional Planning Compact. 
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implied limitation.’”156  As such, regulatory takings are not found “in the case 
of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, 
variances, and the like.”157  Arguably, the moratoria imposed by the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency were but changes in the existing zoning ordinances, 
or perhaps a temporary freeze on development that could even be an implied 
limitation of property ownership.158  Nevertheless, the question remains as to 
how long the government can restrict development before it becomes a taking.  
The Chief Justice argued: 
[A] moratorium prohibiting all economic use . . . is not one of the 
longstanding, implied limitations of state property law.  Moratoria are 
“‘interim’ controls on the use of . . . land development in an area by either 
‘freezing’ existing land uses or by allowing the issuance of building permits for 
only certain land uses that would not be inconsistent with a contemplated 
zoning plan or zoning change.159 
Besides taking issue with the length of the moratorium,160 the dissent 
criticized the majority’s refusal to apply the categorical rule of Lucas on the 
 
 156. Id. at 351 (quoting Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413). 
 157. Id. at 351-52. 
 158. Id.  “A property owner cannot reasonably rely on an assumption that zoning will forever 
remain the same, and that the government will refrain indefinitely from valid changes in zoning to 
enhance the public interest (including interim periods of cessation in development in order to 
prepare for such changes.)”  W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Cambridge City Council, 779 N.E.2d 
141, 155 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).  Accord Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 
(1992) (stating a “property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, 
from time to time, by various measures newly enacted . . . in legitimate exercise of [the] police 
powers.”) (emphasis added).  See also Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (noting property owners “cannot . . . insist on a guarantee of non-interference by 
government when they well knew or should have known that, in response to widely-shared public 
concerns, . . . government actions were being planned and executed that would directly affect 
their new economic investments”). 
 159. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Rehnquist 
noted that traditional moratoria “prohibit only certain categories of development . . . [and] do not 
implicate Lucas [because] they do not deprive landowners of all economically beneficial use of 
their land.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 160. See id. at 343-44.  The Chief Justice believed that the Court should not have limited 
itself to determining only whether the thirty-two month moratorium on development brought 
about by the TRPA was a taking of property, but rather, the Court should have inquired more 
generally into the nature of the harm and whether the respondent TRPA caused the harm.  The 
majority inexplicably dismissed this possibility, arguing that the 1984 injunction, issued by the 
District Court, was the cause of further delay after the TRPA’s adoption of the regional plan.  
This followed a lengthy freeze on development and was adjudged “reasonable” in the majority’s 
opinion.  The majority noted that the plan allowed for the development of single family 
residences.  The Chief Justice observed, however, that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency was 
the “moving force” behind the injury because the injunction enjoining the 1984 plan was only 
authorized because the plan itself, approved by the TRPA, “did not comply with the 
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ground that the deprivation was “temporary.”161  Because the TRPA in effect 
denied landowners of all economically viable use of their land, the dissent 
believed that where “the owner of real property has been called upon to 
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, 
that is, to leave property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”162  In 
fact, Rehnquist characterized the regulations imposing the temporary ban on all 
economic use as a forced leasehold.163  He was also worried about creating an 
“incentive for government to simply label any prohibition on development 
‘temporary’ or to fix a set number of years,”164 no matter how long a 
moratorium lasts in reality, in order to avoid the just compensation 
requirement.  The dissent argued strongly for the application of the categorical 
rule and would have opted not to differentiate between physical appropriation 
and regulations that deny all productive use of land, no matter however 
brief.165 
Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent joined by Justice Scalia, argued the 
alleged fact that the property would “logically . . . recover [its] value as soon as 
the [moratorium was] lifted” must have been a very small consolation to one 
who had purchased land with reasonable expectations of development and who 
 
environmental requirements of [the Agency’s] regulations” and thus violated the Compact for 
which the TRPA was directed to act!  See id. at 345-46. 
 161. Id. at 347.  The Chief Justice pointed out, “[U]nder the Court’s decision today, the 
takings question turns entirely on the initial label given a regulation, a label that is often without 
much meaning.”  Id. 
 162. Id. at 346 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019) (emphasis in original).  The dissent noted 
that the District Court found it to be a fact that the petitioners were forced to leave their land 
economically idle, and neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court disputed that the 
landowners could not develop during this period.  Id. at 346.  In Lucas, Justice Scalia noted: 
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that 
when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically 
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property 
economically idle, he has suffered a taking. 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.  Though the categorical rule of Lucas is still good law and there are very 
good reasons for the rule, this statement by Justice Scalia appears to be overruled in part by the 
holding in Tahoe-Sierra because there was no categorical rule applied where “the owner of real 
property [was] called upon to . . . leave his property economically idle” for a time.  Id.  The 
wisdom of this implication will no doubt continue to be disputed. 
 163. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 347. The district court found that a taking occurred because no permanent date was 
set for the end of the moratorium, and thus, its length was indefinite.  See id. at 316-17. 
 165. Id. at 349-50.  The Chief Justice observed: 
In “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of 
land is permitted,” it is less likely that “the legislature is simply ‘adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life’ . . . in a manner that secures an ‘average reciprocity of 
advantage’ to everyone concerned” . . . and more likely that the property “is being pressed 
into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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had been unable to develop for six years.166  Instead of applying a loose factor 
analysis where a landowner has admittedly been deprived of all productive 
uses of property, the dissent desired to formulate a hard and fast rule for 
regulatory takings that would characterize property merely as any interest in 
the bundle of sticks.167  Noting that calculating the composition of the 
denominator in the deprivation fraction is a difficult and uncertain question, 
Justice Thomas took the position that “First English put to rest the notion that 
the ‘relevant denominator’ [could be] land’s infinite life,”168 and would 
measure the regulated property right against the same property interest, 
therefore appearing to find a taking when any stick in the bundle of property 
rights is removed.  He believed that a regulation effecting a total deprivation of 
a temporal slice of a property right should be a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment “regardless of whether the property so burdened retains [some] 
theoretical useful life and value if . . . the ‘temporary’ moratorium is lifted.”169 
It appears that applying the rigid Lucas rule under these circumstances, 
where the deprivation of property is by its terms temporary, would effectively 
deny the fact that the Lucas opinion itself emphasized at least “eighteen times 
that there is no categorical tak[ing] unless all value and use has been 
permanently deprived.”170  The dissenting justices focus only a small, albeit 
valuable, temporal portion of the property owners’ interest in their land to find 
a taking.  Looking to the archaic way they characterize property rights, this 
result was inevitable.  The dissenting justices look only toward what the land 
owners have lost instead of looking at the bigger picture and balancing the 
interests of all involved.  By adhering to a strict bundle of sticks notion of 
property, the dissent fails to acknowledge that bundles of property rights must 
 
 166. Id. at 356 (citations omitted).  But see Echeverria, supra note 113, at 11237 (“evidence 
showed that owners in the basin typically held their property for 25 years before seeking 
development approval”). 
 167. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas ended his 
discussion with the statement that “in the long run, we are all dead.”  Id. (citing KEYNES, supra 
note 151).  He noted that “individuals and families were deprived of the opportunity to build 
single-family homes as permanent, retirement, or vacation residences on land upon which such 
construction was authorized when purchased.” Id.  However, such an analysis, while refusing to 
look to the long term economic value of the property, also fails to take account of the Court’s 
holding in Palazzolo, namely that a landowner taking title to land after the enactment of a 
regulation depriving his land of economic value is not automatically deprived from bringing a 
takings claim.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001).  The holding in Tahoe-
Sierra appears to be the converse—just because development was authorized when a landowner 
took title does not automatically preclude the regulatory body from exercising its authority to 
limit the land use without being subject to a takings claim. 
 168. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 356. 
 170. FREILICH, supra note 28, at 61.  See also Paul Barta, It’s About Time: The United States 
Supreme Court Correctly Rejects Temporal Severance in Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 479 (2003). 
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emanate from a thing.171  Thus, the definition of property through which they 
approach the regulatory takings analysis is incomplete. 
D. The Parcel As A Whole 
The “parcel as a whole” theory is the opposite of the conceptual severance 
approach, for it does not allow landowners to segment their property interests 
in such a way so that the loss of one interest could be viewed as a total taking 
requiring compensation.  As commonly defined, the term “property” means 
“[p]ossessions considered as a group.”172  Looking at the property rights or 
interests of landowners in the aggregate, the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra 
adopted the theory of property articulated in Penn Central.173  There, the Court 
refused to limit its definition of the relevant property for the purpose of the 
Fifth Amendment takings analysis solely to the regulated interest and rejected 
dividing a single parcel into discrete segments.174  The lingering effect of Penn 
Central combined with the rationale of the Tahoe-Sierra majority is that the 
Court should view all of the property interest as the denominator in the so-
called takings equation, rather than characterizing only the regulated interest of 
the property as the guidepost against which to measure the amount of the 
property interest that has allegedly been taken.175 
The Tahoe-Sierra opinion noted that in Andrus v. Allard and Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Supreme Court affirmed that 
“where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of 
one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking.”176  The majority declared that “[a]n 
interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe its 
geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal 
 
 171. See Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based 
Resource, 32 ENVTL L. 733, 789 (2002) (noting that the “single-minded” metaphor of the bundle 
of sticks “amounts to a new kind of absolutist monolith that is seriously out of touch with 
alterations that have occurred and continue to occur in the law”).  Duncan observes that “the 
conception of ownership embodied in the bundle metaphor cannot be squared with contemporary 
knowledge and values.”  Id. at 783. 
 172. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1097 (3d ed. 2000).  The dictionary 
also defines real property as something owned, tangible or intangible, to which the owner has 
legal title.  Id. 
 173. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334. 
 174. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978). 
 175. See generally Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 
see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331 (stating that “the starting point for the [District] court’s 
analysis should have been to ask whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then 
Penn Central was the proper framework”). 
 176. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327.  See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) 
(holding that “the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking”); 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 480 (1987). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] THE METAPHYSICS OF PROPERTY 739 
aspect . . . .”177  By viewing property interests in the aggregate, the Supreme 
Court attempted, perhaps unintentionally, to integrate the traditional pre-
Hohfeldian conception of property as a distinctive right in a thing that is good 
against the world back into the working definition of property. 
The approach to the denominator problem taken by the majority in Tahoe-
Sierra was necessary to make whole an idea of property that is “good against 
the world” and that could be balanced against the police power of the state.  
The perspective of the parcel as a whole allows the Court to weigh the 
regulated property interests against the property interests retained by the owner 
in determining if a taking has occurred.  “[W]e need the parcel-as-a-whole rule 
to preserve the essential character of balancing: the fact that balancing looks to 
more than one factor.  Value alone should not predominate.”178  Viewing the 
parcel as a whole does not allow the property owner to divide the interests into 
discrete segments, whether they be horizontal (parceling the geographic metes 
and bounds of the land), vertical (dividing property rights into air rights or 
mineral rights, unless by statutory authorization), or temporal (separating 
interests according to present or future fragments of the term of years 
contained in the claim of right to the property in the first place).  To the extent 
that the categorical rule expressed in Lucas requires that the landowner be 
deprived of all economically viable use of a property interest, the parcel as a 
whole doctrine precludes the use of only one aspect of the bundle of property 
rights when measuring it against the prohibitions or limitations set upon the 
property by regulation. 
IV.  THE ENDGAME: FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE 
Imagine two potential developers possessing title to real property in the 
Lake Tahoe Basin.  Each prospective developer is given a choice.  One can 
build a lavish home with no limitation in respect to the land area used, the 
capacity of infrastructure needed, or the amount of resources damaged as a 
result of building.  On the other hand, a landowner could choose to build a 
more humble abode that consumes less space and causes little, if any, damage 
to the surrounding environment.  Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma analysis, the 
economically rational outcome is that both “prisoners” would refuse to 
“cooperate” and would not choose to develop modestly but would instead build 
the most luxurious structure they could afford.  This attitude generates 
resource-intensive development built over large amounts of land because each 
homeowner stands to gain more, both financially and in other aspects like 
 
 177. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32 (emphasis added). 
 178. Wright & Laughner, supra note 72, at 11188 (arguing that the “distinction [is] clear” 
between a temporary moratorium and its analogy by Chief Justice Rehnquist to a leasehold, 
which is a temporal interest in land, such that “[a]bsent physical invasion, all dimensions of the 
property must be viewed in their entirety”). 
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personal luxury, than the other choice presented.179  If both landowners 
cooperated with each other and engaged in responsible development, neither 
would realize a lavish dream house, although both may experience moderate 
gains.180  However, if one landowner builds a small home in a more 
environmentally sensitive manner while the neighbor opts to build a mansion 
or develop in a way that substantially escalates the amount of impervious 
coverage, the latter may be said to win by acquiring the goodwill of the former 
who sacrifices in order to preserve the lake by developing in a more 
environmentally accountable manner.181 
This dilemma exemplifies the predicament faced in the Lake Tahoe Basin 
and in other development hotspots around the country.  The reality is that in an 
era of mushrooming land development, especially during economic boom 
times, to maximize the intake of capital, each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his land use without limit—in a world that is by its 
 
 179. See Susan Hallatt, The Smart Growth Debate: A Prisoner’s Dilemma—Who Wins and 
Who Loses After Selfish Development Decisions are Tallied?, Planetizen: The Planning & 
Development Network, at http://www.planetizen.com/oped/item.php?id=71 (Nov. 4, 2002) 
(concluding that “the Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates unequivocally the benefits of cooperation 
over ‘selfishness’”). 
  Under the Prisoner’s Dilemma analysis, this situation is termed the zero-sum result with 
no benefit because each economic individual’s gain, though not insignificant, will be offset by the 
other developer’s failure to cooperate.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma “captures the net benefit of 
choice.”  Id.  The typical example involves a situation where a crime was committed and there are 
no witnesses.  If two suspects, or prisoners, separated and interrogated, choose to cooperate with 
each other by not confessing, they will both benefit by obtaining lighter sentences.  If one 
cooperates but the other does not and tells on the other in exchange for a plea, the latter wins and 
the cooperator gets hit with the stiffer penalty.  In our example, the cooperator is the modest, 
responsible homebuilder who loses because the other gains much more financially because of his 
disregard of the consequences of his actions, not to mention he has a bigger house.  If both 
prisoners confess, each gets a medium sentence and no one wins.  The logic of this brief article 
seems to imply by analogy that if both developers seek their own short-term interest and refuse to 
cooperate, such environmentally taxing development might have the effect of sending both to 
“jail” because over time, their selfish actions will produce a benefit for no one.  A zero-sum result 
will occur.  The prison in this metaphor is a completely short-term, market-driven basis for action 
as opposed to the benefits to property value that could be realized from long-term planning and 
ecologically conscious development.  For a better explanation of the case of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 269 n.9 (1971). 
 180. Each homeowner, for example, could still have a home in the Lake Tahoe Basin and 
would also help ensure the region maintains the environmental quality that attracted people to the 
area in the first place. 
 181. Not just homeowners, however, cause the problem.  “Development activities such as ski 
areas and golf courses have contributed greatly to the nutrient loading of the lake.”  E. Clement 
Shute, Jr., Interim Development Controls & Moratoria Under the Ninth Circuit Decision in 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN at § 15.02 (2001). 
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nature limited.182  There is seemingly no incentive, fiscal or otherwise, for one 
to develop in a manner that is not resource-intensive, especially when the 
burdens associated with development are not likely borne by the developer, but 
rather are shifted to the public resource in such a way that is not immediately 
noticeable.  Thus the question remains as to how the scales of justice may 
properly be balanced to ensure that the government, while managing the spread 
of humankind’s urban footprint, refrains from going “too far” in regulating 
private land use. 
What is needed in this land use puzzle is a rule that protects the integrity of 
private property, the foundation upon which our nation was founded, as 
opposed to policy that merely seeks to protect potential economic injuries.  A 
democratic process, with adequate checks to ensure there is no tyranny of the 
majority,183 could perhaps provide for adequate safeguards for planners and 
landowners alike.  Epstein has rightly observed that the moratorium caused 
landowners with undeveloped land to bear the burdens caused by those who 
already had developed.184  It is clearly “inequitable to bestow a benefit upon 
some people” while taking rights from others, so to balance the effects of such 
regulation, a possible solution could be to evaluate the extent to which the 
regulation enhanced the economic value of the developed parcels of land 
(especially those whose impervious coverage contributed to the problem in the 
first place) and redistribute the benefits they received across the universe of 
landowners who have borne the costs of the regulation that effected a “taking” 
of their property.185  Such a situation could properly balance the scales of 
justice—the government could prepare a plan to confront the regional problem, 
taking some time to develop an effective solution, the adversely affected 
landowners may take comfort in the fact that the costs they bear will be 
redistributed, and the owners of currently developed land would give back any 
 
 182. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) 
(observing that the economically rational herdsman will conclude that in the short term the 
sensible course is to add more animals to his herd grazing on common land, thus each herdsman 
seeks to maximize his profit without regard to the devastating effects that over-consumption of 
resources will have on the common land in the long run and that each herdsman pursues his own 
interests by acting in ways that realize an immediate utility to each at the expense of the whole 
commons). 
 183. NEDELSKY, supra note 19, at 18 (noting that to the founders, the propertied class must 
necessarily be the minority and that the property-less majority would have no direct interest in 
protecting the rights of private property).  Perhaps government has its most legitimate role out of 
the necessity for the protection of land and its capacity to protect the interests of another 
minority—the environmentally conscious—against the seeming majority of private property 
owners. 
 184. Richard A. Epstein, Taking By Slivers: Ruling Shows How Factional Politics can 
Survive Despite Constitutional Efforts to Limit Government Abuse by Protecting Property Rights, 
169 N.J. L.J., July 29, 2002, at S-9. 
 185. See Bell & Parchmovsky, supra note 47, at 554. 
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windfall they received while not being held responsible for any problem their 
previously developed land might have caused. 
A. The Citizen’s Responsibility: Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas186 
Justice Holmes’s statement in Pennsylvania Coal regarding the reciprocity 
of advantage of a regulation reminds us that property ownership exists in a 
society.187  Society by its nature is built upon a system of laws as opposed to 
the war of all against all, or what Eighteenth Century philosophers called the 
state of nature.188  Thus, our rights, even to property, must be subject to certain 
inherent limitations in exchange for the guarantee that these rights exist.  But 
does this idea of an intrinsic constraint conflict with traditional American 
ideals?189 
While there is a strong argument for individual liberty and the absolute 
right to use one’s property, such use must necessarily be limited to some 
extent.  Almost one hundred years ago, “new conceptions of the relations of 
property to human welfare” were recognized, maintaining “that every man 
holds his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its 
use to whatever degree the public welfare may require.”190  The more 
significant question though, is to what extent the use of land can be limited.  
The use of one’s property, however beneficial to the individual or to the 
society at large that recognizes the importance on personal freedom, cannot be 
allowed to injure the rights of other citizens in their respective properties or in 
 
 186. “So use your own as not to injure another’s property.” 
 187. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (noting that “with a moratorium there is a clear 
‘reciprocity of advantage’ because it protects the interests of all affected landowners against 
immediate construction that might be inconsistent with the provisions of the plan that is 
ultimately adopted”). 
 188. See Charles K. Rowley, State of Nature and Civil Society, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 514, 516-17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (clarifying 
and commenting about the supposed dichotomy between the state of nature and civil society).  
Later in the passage, the author expands upon the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and 
explains the “war of all against all.”  Id. at 517-18. 
 189. See NEDELSKY, supra note 19, at 65-95 (discussing the philosophies of Pennsylvania’s 
Gouverneur Morris concerning the market economy).  See also Paul Turner & Sam Kalen, 
Takings and Beyond: Implications for Regulation, 19 ENERGY L.J. 25 (1998). 
 190. BETHELL, supra note 29, at 175 (quoting Theodore Roosevelt).  In 1910, Theodore 
Roosevelt stated: 
We are face to face with new conceptions of the relations of property to human welfare, 
chiefly because certain advocates of the rights of property as against the rights of men 
have been pushing their claims too far.  The man who wrongly holds that every human 
right is secondary to his profit must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who 
rightly maintains that every man holds his property subject to the general right of the 
community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may require. 
Id. at 174-75. 
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the rights of the public in commonly held pieces of property.191  We must 
avoid the temptation to define property and property rights as merely 
functional means to the end of wealth maximization or strictly economic gain, 
or even as existing solely because of their innate utility to the greater good of 
free enterprise.  Property serves a more important role in the American 
story.192  For it is in the labor that man exerts that creates that connection 
between a human being and his or her parcel of land that was believed to 
inculcate virtue and foster the development of republican ideals.193  It was once 
not only in its marketability that property had value.  Thus, the land should not 
be viewed as simply an asset.  Property is more than the alienability of a parcel 
of land; it is a collective mass of rights that brings liberty and social 
responsibility.  It is dangerous to view the property interests the Constitution 
was created to protect as purely economic.  As Justice Holmes observed, the 
“Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether 
of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez 
faire.”194 
The rational economic person in today’s world likely cares more about the 
rights in property owned individually than with the long-term effects that some 
of his activities might have on a nearby public resource.195  The nature of our 
economic system seems to take for granted any part of the natural world that is 
 
 191. See David S. Wilgus, Comment, The Nature of Nuisance: Judicial Environmental Ethics 
and Landowner Stewardship in the Age of Ecology, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 99, 102 (2001).  The 
author presents a thoughtful comment on our age, noting: 
[T]raditional notions of property law must contend with new scientific discoveries about 
our environment  . . . [and] . . . [c]onsistent with our new understanding of the 
environment, courts should adjust modern property law to include a condition of 
stewardship within the common law notions of what it means to be a property owner in 
the twenty-first century. 
Id. at 100-02.  See also Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within 
Nature’s Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927 (2000) (advocating for a reconciliation of property 
rights and ecological consciousness that focuses less on individual freedom and more on the 
environmental effects of property use). 
 192. Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government: 
The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2000) (noting 
that “[p]roperty rights are, of course, important in the American view of ordered liberty”). 
 193. See MCCOY, supra note 5, at 65. 
 194. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 195. However, while he may never actually “use” the lake, the landowner who develops on 
lakefront property certainly benefits from its existence, and, in the case of Lake Tahoe, its 
uniqueness.  But to the extent that his property will not lose value in the reasonably foreseeable 
future, for example, if the lake’s clarity is not significantly diminished until sometime late in the 
Twenty-first Century or even later, what economic incentive does the landowner have to care?  
Perhaps one solution to the problems in Lake Tahoe would be to privatize the surface of the lake 
itself, giving adjacent landowners a concrete legal interest in the property that could support an 
action in nuisance or trespass. 
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not reducible to economic quantification and fails to recognize the value of 
nature’s assets, causing us to seriously underappreciate the ecosystems that 
provide vital services.196  Richard Epstein has observed that a “primary goal of 
a system of property is to provide islands of independence that allow all 
individuals to pursue their own projects without interference from others.”197  
While it is true that individuals may pursue their ends without interference 
from others to a certain extent, when is it that an island in pursuance of these 
projects has gone “too far”?  A proper theory of property will be able to answer 
this question.  Epstein also adds that the difficult part is to ensure that “rights 
created in the long run are worth more than the correlative duties that are 
necessarily imposed.”198  From this perspective, how can the duty to forestall 
development for some period of time—three months or three years—be 
considered a taking when one realizes that, in the long run, the property rights 
protected will undoubtedly be “worth more” than the imposed duty to postpone 
development or to develop one’s property in an environmentally sensitive 
manner?199 
In Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, Epstein 
represents the model property rights advocate who wants the court to adopt the 
conceptual severance theory, with the view that all takings of any part of an 
 
 196. Katherine Ellison & Gretchen C. Daily, Natural Assets, NATURE CONSERVANCY, Fall 
2002, at 88.  “We don’t watch Earth’s assets in the same way we dog our investments.”  Id.  The 
authors of this essay argue for the pressing need for a full accounting of nature’s services and a 
realization that engineered substitutes can be more costly than preserving earthly assets in the first 
place.  Id. 
  For example, the cost to preserve Lake Tahoe by treating it with massive amounts of 
chemicals while continuing to allow erosion and damage to the chemical balance of the lake 
caused by the impervious coverage of development could be enormous in terms of money, not to 
mention the unknown adverse environmental impact of the chemicals.  From that perspective, a 
delay in further development might not seem such a bad idea.  In fact, after an assessment is done 
by a scientific authority, then, with proper citizen and government participation, it may even be 
concluded that it would be more cost effective to continue the rate of development while curing 
the lake through alternative remedial strategies. 
 197. Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187, 
190 (1992). 
 198. Id. (emphasis added). 
 199. This is true especially considering the fact that most people hold property in the Lake 
Tahoe basin for an average of twenty-five years before they begin to develop, a fact that may 
allow one to argue that even a six-year waiting period is not excessive.  Those who do not 
properly look to the “long run” are effectively trying to beat the system.  Those landowners that 
rushed to development before the enactment of use restrictions in a heavily regulated “industry” 
were trying to place burdens disproportionately on the public so that they could realize economic 
gain. 
  To make certain that rights created are worth more than the duties imposed should 
perhaps lead us to create more rules for developmental moratoria.  A system that limits moratoria 
to certain circumstances and precise time limitations might properly balance the interests of all 
involved and reflect the ideals embodied in the Constitutional structure. 
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individual’s property interest require compensation from the state.200  His 
proposed notion of the proper relationship between the individual and the state 
argues that requiring compensation for every regulation that diminishes 
property value would properly balance the “monopoly of force [by the 
sovereign] and . . . the preservation of liberty and property.”201  Though 
seeming to echo the framers’ intent, this statement reflects a Lochner–era 
distrust in the power of the sovereign that has become an essential element of 
the property rights movement.202  Attempting to strike the appropriate balance 
between individual landowners and regulatory authority, Epstein believes the 
exclusion from the use of one’s own property is a taking regardless of how 
long it lasts.203  In fact, Epstein disagreed with Justice Stevens who, in writing 
for the majority in Tahoe-Sierra, seemed to assume that the test for whether 
property is taken is directed more toward what the owner retains than what he 
has lost.204  However, as it is true that justice is intimately related to the idea of 
property,205 a fair and just inquiry into the takings question must necessarily 
focus on both what the regulation takes away from the property owner as well 
as what rights the property owner retains. 
B. The Planner’s Responsibility 
In 1980, Justice Brennan inquired into an apparent double standard in the 
law when he noted that “[a]fter all, a policeman must know the Constitution, 
then why not a planner?”206  The Tahoe-Sierra decision, while a victory for 
land-use planning, squarely places upon the planners the duty to stay within the 
Constitution—within the parameters of developed takings law and to carefully 
consider the Fifth Amendment when forming land-use regulations and using 
planning tools like moratoria.  The Tahoe-Sierra decision seems to give 
planning officials faced with significant growth pressures some breathing room 
to more thoroughly consider how best to manage the modifications to their 
community’s land use.  The sharp criticism from the dissent and some of the 
 
 200. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 15. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See generally Herber, supra note 27.  See also Talmadge, supra note 192, at 858 (noting 
that “[t]he ideologically driven views of the modern-day property-rights advocates, however, 
would effectively undercut the police power by elevating policy disputes to constitutional 
dimensions, thereby transferring the decision-making process from the people acting through 
their elected representatives to the courts”). 
 203. Epstein, supra note 184, at S-11. 
 204. Id.  Epstein inferred that such a conception of property might inspire the government to 
“take” property piece by piece.  Id. 
 205. Tom Bethell, Introduction: Property and Justice, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter 
1990, at 1 (noting “without private property there can be no justice” and “an important reason for 
studying law . . . should be to inquire into the relationship between property and justice”). 
 206. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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nation’s most preeminent legal scholars, as well the majority’s emphasis on 
“considerations of fairness and justice,” however, should give planners a note 
of caution to take the utmost care when formulating a planning regime.  Tahoe-
Sierra reinforces the notion that delay is an inevitable part of the land-use 
planning and regulatory process, perhaps even one of the normal incidents to 
property ownership.207  But moratoria should only be used as a last resort. 
Local, state, or regional government planners run the risk that the 
upholding of temporary development moratoria will become nothing more than 
a temporary victory for the land-use planning movement.  For a government 
entity to avoid liability, an allegedly taken property right must first inhere in 
the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the state’s law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.208  Justice Stevens’s 
review of “fairness and justice” concerns in his analysis indicates that the 
options for governments to regulate land use are expanding.  Planners still have 
a very serious responsibility to review the regulatory decision-making 
processes and to ensure that land-use regulations not only foster previously 
articulated goals but also permit individual landowners to use their property in 
some reasonable economic manner during the adoption of land use guidelines.  
The majority in Tahoe-Sierra did make it clear, though, that the planners’ task 
to protect and represent the public in fostering strategic growth while also 
refraining from interfering with individual property rights plays such an 
essential role in society that a hard and fast categorical rule cannot encompass 
all of the intricacies associated with such a fundamental responsibility.209  
Thus, public policy is best served by approaching the regulatory takings 
question with a set of standards (albeit a set that is as of yet undeveloped) 
based upon the foundation of considerations of fairness and justice. 
The land-use planning process can effectively serve those goals by 
adhering to its self-imposed guidelines.  Allowing for public involvement in 
the development of regional growth strategies might also be desirable, though 
it is not without its own flaws.  Professor Epstein has observed “the unjustified 
loss” in which he notes that the actual rolling moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra had 
the “intended consequence” of shutting out outsiders indefinitely from the land 
 
 207. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (noting that reasonable landowners must expect those “normal delays in 
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like”). 
 208. See Esplanade Properties, L.L.C. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that the lawmaker accused of the taking cannot be liable if the interests allegedly taken 
were not part of the original title in accordance with background principles of the property law of 
the jurisdiction) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (1992)).  See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 
(noting a state may resist paying compensation only if the “logically antecedent inquiry into the 
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to 
begin with”). 
 209. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323-25. 
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use decision-making process.  He argued that honoring the Fifth Amendment 
requirement would force the “planning agency to reconsider its hands-off 
attitude to the current uses that initially created the land-use problem.”210  
Epstein points out a flaw in Justice Stevens’s economic analysis that assumes 
that the behavior of planners and of incumbent homeowners would remain the 
same even if the compensation requirement was imposed.211  He has identified 
a real problem in land-use planning with focusing restrictions and regulations 
solely on future development instead of attempting to address the pre-existing 
land uses that may be short of actionable nuisance but that have caused the 
problems and created the need for the intense regulation to remedy the 
situation.212  Owners of already developed property might have been involved 
in the political process, but they surely had a motive to encourage the TRPA to 
preclude further residential development on undeveloped land.  However, if 
the use of vast amounts of impervious coverage in development is the culprit 
causing the Lake Tahoe crisis, absent any specific legislative authorization, a 
common law nuisance action, or any violation of a background principal of 
state property law, it would be difficult to find any legal remedy for the 
government or the public to protect Lake Tahoe from property owners who 
develop their property without considering whether such development would 
be good for the Lake.  Instead of the all-or-nothing approach, the challenge is 
to find a just balance of power and liberty.213 
C. Property: The Guardian of Every Other Right214 
“Because property rights are no longer significant protections against 
[seemingly] arbitrary state power, those on both the political left and right have 
made efforts to rethink what property is and what role it should play in our 
society.”215  It is apparent that clear lines cannot be drawn.  Only a balancing 
of expectations can internalize a more fluid concept of property.  But the 
 
 210. Epstein, supra note 184, at S-11.  But see Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393, 
417-18 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that “the purpose of a restriction does not cease 
to be public, because incidentally some private persons may thereby receive gratuitously valuable 
special benefits”). 
 211. Epstein, supra note 184. 
 212. See generally Robert Innes, Takings, Compensation, an Equal Treatment for Owners of 
Developed and Undeveloped Property, 40 J. L. & ECON. 403 (1997). 
 213. PETER W. SALSICH JR. & TIMOTHY TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS & PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW 116 (2d ed. 2003) (noting the 
“importance of establishing policies before regulations are enacted”). 
 214. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1998).  “The right of property . . . is the guardian of every 
other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.”  Id. (quoting 
ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN, 
IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (1775)). 
 215. SCHULTZ, supra note 22, at 127. 
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question remains as to how the law should properly balance the interests of 
liberty and property in a modern democratic society. 
In commenting upon the general structure of the takings problem, Bruce 
Ackerman has identified the following essential question: “[I]s it fair to say 
that the state has taken one of [the property owner’s] things away from 
him?”216  The petitioners in Tahoe-Sierra included the Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council—a nonprofit membership corporation representing 
approximately two thousand owners of both improved and unimproved parcels 
of real estate in the Lake Tahoe Basin—as well as a class of some four hundred 
individual owners of vacant lots located on lands where conservation efforts 
focused on restricting development around the lake.217  The “wellspring of 
their undoing” lies in the fact that they asked the Court to apply a categorical 
rule whenever a temporary moratoria or other regulation denies all 
economically viable use of land for any period of time.  In terms familiar to the 
regulatory takings analysis, the landowners perhaps went “too far.”  The Court 
of Appeals in Tahoe-Sierra explicitly refused the temptation to apply the hard 
and fast Lucas rule to the category of temporary restrictions imposed on 
development.  Agreeing, the Supreme Court asserted that the multiple 
standards of Penn Central are “the appropriate framework for analysis.”218 
The costs of litigating would impose serious burdens both upon the 
individual property owner and on the judicial system itself if each landowner 
was forced to bring his case individually, especially when compared to a broad 
rule that might be applied categorically.219  Also, the district court held that the 
moratoria did not violate the Penn Central balancing test, but rather was a 
categorical taking under Lucas,220 even though the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
found there to be no taking whatsoever.221  Although individual landowners 
generally might have a better chance of prevailing under the multi-factor test 
and ad hoc judicial inquiries by bringing as-applied challenges to regulations, 
substantial procedural barriers tend to push objectors toward facial challenges 
 
 216. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 101. While this is the role of the courts, the “Policymaker 
is obliged to determine the best way in which the costs involved in moving to a better world are 
to be distributed among the citizenry . . . .”  Id. at 30.  Ackerman also presents a discussion of a 
more complex question—should the property owner be left bearing the entire loss associated with 
the legal change or should this loss be spread among his fellow citizens?  See id. at 29-40. 
 217. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312. 
 218. Id. at 319. 
 219. This concern for cost and the preservation of judicial resources does not seem to be of 
any specific importance to the majority.  If it was, the cost to society and environmental 
protection of applying a broad categorical taking rule to temporary restrictions on development 
must have outweighed this concern. 
 220. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1242 (D. Nev. 1999). 
 221. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 782 
(9th Cir. 2000).  The court noted that the plaintiffs did not even “argue that [the moratoria was] a 
taking under the ad hoc balancing approach described in Penn Central.”  Id. at 773. 
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instead.222  The petitioners seemed to appeal only the ruling that there was no 
categorical taking, and their failure to specifically disapprove of the lower 
courts’ finding that there was no taking under the Penn Central framework 
served as part of the rationale used by the majority to completely avoid 
applying the Penn Central factor analysis it approved in Tahoe-Sierra.223 
The effect of the Tahoe-Sierra decision will remain to be seen as lower 
courts flesh out the majority’s affirmation that the “essentially ad hoc” 
approach to the takings inquiry is the appropriate method of analysis.224  The 
majority in Tahoe-Sierra admitted that considerations of “fairness and justice” 
must play a more central role in the takings analysis and that they could even 
arguably support the conclusion that TRPA’s moratoria constituted takings of 
property.225  Fairness and justice might suggest that the individual claim of 
right should be protected to the utmost extent as the foundation upon which the 
American system is built.  But while land-use planning becomes more 
 
 222. See SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 213, at 114-17 (noting the practical 
considerations of dealing with moratoria that both landowners and planners must bear in mind 
and that contribute to the development of regulatory takings doctrine).  Whether or not 
landowners do have a better chance of prevailing under the Penn Central test is debatable, 
however, landowners certainly “‘face an uphill battle’ that is made especially steep by [a] desire 
for a categorical rule.”  Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 320 (2002) (citations omitted). 
 223. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948 
(2001) (granting certiorari to the Ninth Circuit).  The “[p]etition for writ of certiorari is granted 
limited to the following question: ‘Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a 
temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring 
compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution?’”  Id.  The Chief 
Justice disagreed, however, noting that the certiorari granted was not limited to any of the 
“petition’s specific questions,” and he would have instead characterized the question as the 
broader one of whether or not a taking was effected by the temporary moratorium.  Compare 
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307 n.1, with Transcript of Oral Argument Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 2002 WL 43288, *11 (Jan. 7, 2002) (revealing that Mr. 
Berger, on behalf of petitioners, in response to questioning from the Justices stated, “We did not 
present a Penn Central case, that’s correct.”) 
 224. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Cambridge City Council, 779 N.E.2d 141, 154 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (“[T]he considerations defined in this fashion invite idiosyncratic decision 
making”); Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 799 A.2d 751, 765, 768 
(Pa. 2002) (“This fairness and justice standard, although amorphous, necessarily guides our 
analysis . . . .”  State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775 N.E.2d 493, 495-97 (Ohio 
2002) (reconsidering the case under the Penn Central test and still finding a taking).  See also 
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (5-4 decision) (finding a 
technical taking of private property but not requiring compensation because the Court focused on 
what the property owners lost and not what the government gained).  For a review of Tahoe-
Sierra and commentary on its role in the regulatory takings context, see TAKING SIDES ON 
TAKINGS ISSUE: THE IMPACT OF TAHOE-SIERRA (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2003); Benson R. 
Cohen, Tahoe-Sierra, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Moratorium, 30 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 741 (2003). 
 225. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S at 304. 
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important in modern society, the desire for a practical arrangement and a 
conception of property that will work efficiently, and promote fairness and 
justice, must be the desired end of the Court.  Only a fact-sensitive balancing 
test can achieve such a result. 
Of course, notions of fairness advise that there ought to be certain limits to 
the moratorium power, lest government power be exercised so arbitrarily or 
exist completely beyond the reach of public involvement.  More precise limits 
will help avoid what Chief Justice Rehnquist noted as the “incentive for 
government to simply label any prohibition on development ‘temporary,’ or to 
fix a set number of years” to a regulation, no matter how long, in order to 
allow it pass Constitutional muster.226  In the end, however, only by balancing 
the individual’s rights to property and liberty with the society’s legitimate 
interests in protecting the general welfare can the Court produce a just 
outcome.227  Hard and fast rules are the equivalent of drawing judicial lines in 
the sand—they will eventually wash away with the ebb of the tide of new 
factual circumstances and evolving American jurisprudence and conceptions of 
property. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The framework of the American social contract protects individual private 
property rights from actual and constructive appropriation by government 
entities or other citizens, but the judicial approval of zoning and other land-use 
regulations for many years has favored the police power to restrict land use to 
a greater extent.  In approximately the past twenty years, property rights 
advocates have reacted against the restriction of liberty by taking a strong 
stand against regulation.  Though the conservative minority led by the Chief 
Justice lost the battle over Lake Tahoe and the proposed expansion of Lucas’s 
categorical Takings rule, the war for property is not over.228  It is now clear 
that the Takings inquiry depends on more than just the way in which the 
denominator of some “mythical fraction” is characterized.229  The analysis 
 
 226. Id. at 347 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 227. The pertinent scrutiny must be that “[i]f individual losses are found to be ‘outweighed 
by’ social gains, the measure is deemed legitimate.”  Michelman, supra note 13, at 1193.  In 
1967, Michelman pointed out the dangers and traps of the reliance upon a balancing test.  Id. at 
1193-96. 
 228. This holds true especially when one realizes that the most “static” Court in history 
(unchanged in composition for a period longer than any other Supreme Court configuration) is 
soon due for a change in membership and that Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion 
in Tahoe-Sierra, is the oldest current member.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of 
the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).  See also 
COYLE, supra note 84, at 262 (noting that the “courts are on a journey of discovery, rethinking 
the limits of governmental power over the landowner”). 
 229. See Freilich, supra note 66, at 591. 
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turns not only on the property interest which may be affected by the regulation, 
but on how one defines the underlying meaning actually given to property as 
embodied in the Constitution.230 
The new understanding of property must embrace the totality of the 
concept—encompassing the theoretical collection of sticks, the more tangible 
nature of the physical relation that the lay person associates with it, and an 
explicit awareness of its role as the buffer between power and liberty in order 
to give a wholeness and integrity to the expression.231  “Without an accurate 
understanding of the base [of the pyramid of property rights that is formed by 
the security of the rights of property], our conceptions of what happens in the 
refined atmosphere of the apex will often be distorted, or at least 
incomplete.”232  The problem with the older conception of property is that it is 
an unrefined view that denies the essential function of our legal relationships 
and interests to things and the numerous property rights we possess that might 
be separate and distinct from one another.233  The problem with the strict 
bundle of sticks notion, on the other hand, lies in separating rights from the 
corpus that substantiates them.  Realizing that the bundle is often lost amongst 
those sticks is disconcerting because it makes it difficult to collect all the sticks 
at once and tie them into a neat package we can label “property” that has a 
constitutional meaning.  While undoubtedly a person’s rights in property can 
lack certain interests for various reasons, the glue that holds the bundle 
 
 230. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 231. See Cécile Fabre, Justice, Fairness, and World Ownership, 21 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 
249, 271 (2002) (articulating a new conception of property ownership borrowing some features 
from private ownership standardly understood and some from collective ownership, which the 
author suggests would more directly satisfy concerns of justice and fairness); Lawrence G. Sager, 
Property Rights and the Constitution, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY, supra note 35, at 381.  “[T]he 
link between property rights and the human personality consists of the role of property as a buffer 
between the individual and the state. . . . [and] the new property must consist of legally secured 
claims against the largesse of the state”).  See also Hobhouse, supra note 34, at 397.  His essay 
concludes: 
What we have to aim at would seem to be an analogous relation between the individual 
and the community, adapted to the complexity of modern conditions, combining the 
security of the old regime with the flexibility and freedom of the new, . . . [a]nd for these 
purposes we have to restore to society a direct ownership of some things, but an eminent 
ownership of all things material to the production of wealth, securing “property for use” 
to the individual, and retaining “property for power” for the democratic state. 
Id. 
 232. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 398 (2001). 
 233. See generally JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY (1994).  The author states his 
intention from the outset: “‘[P]roperty’ in its traditional sense, which I call the liberal conception 
of ownership, is truly a myth that ought to be exposed and abandoned.”  Id. at 3.  He continues 
with a discussion of the evolving concept of ownership.  See id. at 15-27. 
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together should never go without notice.  Only this conception can cultivate the 
proper respect, from both individuals and society, for property.234 
The Tahoe-Sierra opinion provided an approach to the takings analysis 
that offers the potential for cultivating a characterization of property that 
balances the interests of government, of society, and of property owners, all 
while realizing the legal system’s ultimate goal of furthering “fairness and 
justice.”  The opinion, however, leaves much room for debate, and the question 
remains open as to the exact method to structure an analysis of an inverse 
condemnation claim.  Perhaps the Court could have articulated a form of 
rational basis approach or an acknowledgment of substantive due process 
rights concerning deprivation of property.235  The Court clearly missed an 
opportunity to create a set formula to determine the boundaries of regulatory 
takings law.  The Court could have set limits on the length of time before 
moratoria effect a taking.  The Court could also have developed a more 
creative test adopting a rebuttable presumption of a taking when certain factors 
are met, thus shifting the burden to the regulatory authority to prove the 
constitutionality of its actions.  Only time will tell if Tahoe-Sierra is an 
anomaly or just the first step towards the development of a more coherent and 
reasoned approach to the question of regulatory takings.  But perhaps there is 
some reason for the vagueness of this doctrine.236 
On its face, it appears the Court’s takings jurisprudence does not concern 
itself with finding some exact definition of property or with addressing any of 
the other metaphysical inquiries of academic circles.  The Supreme Court in 
the end is not the appropriate location for such nebulous examinations, just as 
the courts are not the proper place for deciding the environmental threshold 
carrying capacities of an oligotrophic lake basin.  Rather, the Court is a forum 
for the resolution of concrete disputes affecting true adversaries.  If we look 
beneath the surface and delve into the muddy waters of takings law, we can 
understand why the Court must focus on these fact-intensive disputes if it 
 
 234. In his influential work, Thomas Grey noted: 
The capitalist process, by substituting a mere parcel of shares for the walls of and the 
machines in a factory, takes the life out of the idea of property.  It loosens the grip that 
once was so strong—the grip in the sense of the legal right and the actual ability to do as 
one pleases with one’s own. 
Grey, supra note 35, at 78 n.30 (citation omitted).  To promote at least some sense of 
environmental stewardship, a modern concept of property should not completely conceive of land 
as nothing but a thing to be exploited. 
 235. See generally SCHULTZ, supra note 22, at 183-98.  See also Henry A. Span, Public 
Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 107-08 (2003) 
(arguing that property “owners’ recourse should be equal protection review” where a moratorium 
that is not a pretext for permanent prohibition has been enacted). 
 236. See Mark R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 
93 (1996) (commenting on the “vagueness in takings doctrine [that] may well reflect a deeply 
ingrained societal disagreement about the nature of private property and the role of government”). 
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hopes to make good law.  The definition of property the Court adopts 
understands it as a negotiated term, its meaning bargained for in some middle 
ground between the inviolability of property rights and the power of 
governments to regulate land use.  By understanding that the functional role of 
private property is by its nature flexible, the Tahoe-Sierra majority implied an 
operational definition that reflects the role of property in the economy and 
applied this notion to maintain an appropriate margin between power and 
liberty under the circumstances before the bench.  In the end, the Court’s 
decision might reflect a reaffirmation of the jurisprudence discrediting the due 
process protection of purely economic rights that was established during the 
Lochner era.237 
In avoiding a categorical rule, the Supreme Court in effect has said to the 
planners and property owners of America that the Constitution does not 
embody a definite thing-oriented or bundle-of-sticks theory of property.  
Instead, the Court, for better or worse, is agnostic as to any absolute meaning 
of property, approving what amounts to a negotiated concept of the term and 
only giving guidelines to the parties in order to encourage compromise.238  The 
Supreme Court adopted the multi-factor analysis approach that can account for 
the nuances of each case and provide a mechanism to ensure a result 
embodying notions of fairness and justice.  Such an approach recognizes that it 
is in the interaction between often competing characterizations of property that 
this evolving idea is continually defined and its role woven into the fabric of 
American society.  Only in this way can the Court protect the interests of 
individuals, majoritarian factions, and government regulators from the abuses 
of others. 
Justice Holmes seemed to contend in 1922 that the police power and 
eminent domain exist on opposite ends of the spectrum of government 
authority, and that a line can be drawn somewhere in between in order for 
courts to clearly recognize the difference between a regulation and a taking.  
 
 237. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“Liberty under the 
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is 
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due 
process”). 
 238. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 334-36 (2002) (admitting “the concepts of ‘fairness and 
justice’ that underlie the Takings Clause” are less than fully determinate).  See also Erin Ryan, 
Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning 
Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337 (2002).  For a further description of the way the “meaning 
of property [evolves] concurrently with changes in community values,” see Duncan, supra note 5, 
at 1095.  See also Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 93 (2002).  Perhaps this is the Court’s way of staying out of this complicated debate, leaving 
it to ordinary citizens to define the parameters of our system.  As Learned Hand noted: “For 
myself, it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians . . . .”  LEARNED 
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1960). 
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But the difference is one of degree and not of kind.239  The line in the sand 
representing when government regulation goes “too far” will continue to shift 
with the changing political tides, but it will always remain the divide between 
liberty and the demands of organized society—protecting each one from the 
excesses of the other.  Therefore, land-use planners should use their time more 
efficiently and wisely when imposing development moratoria to control the 
effects of untamed urban growth before the takings pendulum inevitably 
swings back in the other direction and a more robust, meaning for the notion of 
property emerges.  On the other hand, property owners cannot reasonably 
expect absolute land use rights and must yield to the incidents of property 
ownership in a society as well as the checks and balances that majoritarian 
power places upon libertarian principles when government, from time to time, 
adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life. 
Though not flawless, the majority decision in Tahoe-Sierra provides an 
approach to achieving the proper balance of the interests of government and 
the interests of property owners in the regulatory takings analysis.  It is thus 
somewhere in the organic nature of the Constitution that exists the precise 
definition of property as a function of this balancing between the excesses of 
power and liberty.  Until the law recognizes a rule where both the interests of 
liberty and power can be incorporated into the meaning of property, a 
balancing test is the only way to ensure that all property is “duly respected.” 
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